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ABSTRACT 
 
 
     This thesis is a study of the foreign policy of the United States in Latin America from 
the end of the American Civil War in 1865, until the close of the peace negations to end 
the First World War.  It contends that Woodrow Wilson refined the policies and 
strategies of his predecessors to maintain and extend American influence in Latin 
America.  Wilson employed both formal methods, such as military interventions, and 
informal methods, such as treaties and trade agreements, to insure American dominance 
in the hemisphere.   
     The thesis contends that Wilson’s prime motivation was the spread of constitutional 
democracy.  Wilson’s vision of ideal democratic institutions was informed by his racism.  
His belief in the inferiority of non-whites allowed him to reconcile his policies of 
defending and exporting “democracy” when millions of African-Americans and women 
were denied the franchise and other basic rights in the United States.  Wilson’s most 
important contribution to the foreign policy of the United States was the introduction of 
the insistence on democratic institutions.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
      
      Woodrow Wilson is remembered best for his role in creating the League of Nations at 
the close of the First World War.  Most of the studies of Wilson’s vision for a world 
governing system focus on the short time span between the United States’ entry into the 
war in April 1917, and the peace negotiations in 1919.  Historians Thomas Knock and 
Mark Gilderhus see the precursor for Wilson’s League taking form early in his first 
administration in plans for a Pan American Treaty. 1  
     This thesis also looks back past 1917 to find the origins of Wilson’s foreign policy.  
Unlike Knock and Gilderhus, it argues that Wilson’s policies were a culmination and 
refinement of the strategies of his predecessors.  The United States began an expansion 
into Latin America long before Wilson took office, and he continued the trend.  The new 
interpretation offered in this thesis is that Wilson was primarily motivated not by 
economic or strategic concerns, though they certainly played a part, but by the desire to 
spread democracy.  It also contends that Wilson failed to recognize the failure of 
democracy in the United States, evidenced by the disfranchisement of African 
Americans, even while he promoted it abroad.  His domestic and foreign policies are 
linked by Wilson’s racist beliefs that non-whites were not ready to participate in a 
democracy and needed white supervision, often over many years, to prepare them.  
Racism explains how Wilson could justify segregation at home and intervention in Latin 
America, all in the name of democracy.  Through these racist interventions, Wilson 
became the leader of an American Empire in Latin America.  
                                                 
1 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992) and Mark Gilderhus, Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson and the 
Western Hemisphere, 1913-1921  (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986). 
     Wilson took an early interest in the relations between the United States and Latin 
America.  Among his first foreign policy goals was the plan for a Pan American Treaty 
linking all the nations of the Western Hemisphere in a mutual security system, with the 
United States in a leadership role.  Knock and Gilderhaus argue this proposed system 
served as a rough draft for the League of Nations.   
     Wilson aimed to enlist the support of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the most powerful 
nations in Latin America, to assist in implementing his vision of a Pan-American Treaty.  
His plan contained two main points.  The first was “mutual guarantees of political 
independence under republican forms of government and mutual guarantees of territorial 
integrity.”  The second was that the signatories to the treaty would “acquire complete 
control within its jurisdiction of the manufacture and sale of munitions of war.”2  The 
reception of this treaty served as a harbinger of the fate awaiting Wilson’s League of 
Nations.  A promising beginning followed by failure.  
     The wording of these points is telling.  In the first, signatories must guarantee the 
survival of “republican forms of government.”  Wilson believed peace and security rested 
on the establishment and maintenance of liberal democracies.  Member nations would 
only ensure the maintenance of “republican forms of government.”  However, the United 
States would send in the Navy and Marines to ensure compliant governments regardless 
of how they came to power.   
     This thesis argues that Wilson envisioned himself as the leader of a hemispheric 
association of nations, which was in reality an American empire in Latin America.  He 
used the Monroe Doctrine and the promise of increased freedom as justification for his 
                                                 
2 Arthur S. Link ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966),  Vol. 
XXXI, 469.   The Wilson Papers are an invaluable resource for this thesis and will be subsequently cited as 
PWW. 
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actions.  It also contends that Wilson refined the policies of his predecessors.  A state 
department commercial adviser said that the transition from President William Howard 
Taft to Wilson was “one of the few instances in which no break is shown, and no national 
administration overturns the policies of its predecessor.”3  He continued a trend of 
increasing United States involvement in the affairs of Latin America, which is examined 
from the close of the Civil War to the end of the First World War.  A vital ingredient in 
these policies, and one Wilson introduced, was the determination to defend or export 
democracy.  Unlike his forebears Wilson introduced the insistence on democracy, 
building on their legacy he utilized the methods of imperialism (military intervention, 
economic domination) to carry out his plans.  
     This thesis argues that the prime motivation for Wilson’s policies was his belief in 
constitutional, elected government.  An integral ingredient of Wilson’s philosophies 
about government, were his racist beliefs about the inferiority of non-whites.  He formed 
a bond with Progressives and shared their desire to reform politics at home and abroad.4  
This is not to argue that more practical, economic and security issues were irrelevant for 
Wilson, however his belief in the necessity of democracy was paramount.  Wilson was a 
Reformer Imperialist, meaning he insisted on “good government” within the nations he 
dealt with, but reserved the right to judge which states met that criteria, and to take steps 
to ensure such governments existed within their borders, even as the United States often 
failed to achieve those same goals.   
     Like many reformers Wilson believed he knew better what others needed and how to 
deliver it to them.  The primacy of reform for Wilson is evident in his words and actions.  
                                                 
3 Quoted in Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America.  
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 222. 
4 Knock, 17-21. 
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In a campaign speech in 1912 he declared the United States held a special position in the 
world as a disseminator of democracy.  He said “we are chosen and prominently chosen 
to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty.”5  
This was no idle campaign promise for Wilson and he attempted to deliver on it using the 
tools of empire. 
     Wilson’s racism obscured his vision of a new world order.  While the president of 
Princeton University, Wilson successfully persuaded all African Americans to withdraw 
their applications for admission.6  Josephus Daniels, a Wilson campaign manager and 
later his Secretary of the Navy, stoked racial fears in East St. Louis to garner votes.7  
Once in office, Wilson told “darky” stories and jokes during cabinet meetings and 
presided over the segregation of the Department of the Treasury, Post Office and the 
Bureau of Engraving.8  These offices had been desegregated since the end of the Civil 
War.  Wilson refused to condemn the lynching of blacks and the only federal actions 
taken regarding racial conflict were to keep African Americans from attaining equality.9
     Wilson’s views on race applied to all non-whites.  He often warned against the 
“yellow peril” emerging from China and Japan.10  At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, 
aware of the ramifications at home, Wilson worked to ensure a Japanese proposal 
                                                 
5 PWW. Campaign Address, May 26, 1912.  24, 443. 
6 Henry Blumenthal, “Woodrow Wilson and the Race Question,” The Journal of Negro History 48, no. 1 
(Jan. 1963) 2. 
7 David Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 282. 
8 Kenneth O’Reilly, “The Jim Crow Policies of Woodrow Wilson,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher 
Education, no. 17 (Autumn 1997) 118. 
9 Robert H. Zieger, America’s Great War: World War I and the American Experience (New York: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 207. 
10 Ibid, 51.   
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proclaiming racial equality was excluded from the League of Nations Covenant.11  
Wilson believed that non-whites were unprepared to participate in democratic processes 
and it was his and the United States mission to educate them on how to do so.12   
     Wilson’s beliefs were formed by his upbringing in the South.  Wilson was born in 
Georgia and as a young boy witnessed the Civil War.  His parents were southern 
sympathizers during the war.13  As an adult politician and member of the Democratic 
Party, he relied on the “solid South” as his main area of support.  He filled his 
administration with fellow southerners like Josephus Daniels.14    
     He articulated his beliefs on the importance of democracy early in his intellectual 
career in a paper titled The Modern Democratic State.  Written in 1885, the paper became 
the basis for many of Wilson’s foreign and domestic policies.  He wrote, “democracy is 
the fullest form of state life.”  Wilson argued that those new to the process needed a 
“period of political tutelage,” before they were ready to properly participate in the 
democratic process.15  This supposed need for a period of tutelage was Wilson’s method 
of justifying interventions in Latin America and the disfranchisement of blacks in the 
United States.  Non-whites needed the guidance of whites, often lasting many years, until 
they were ready to operate autonomously in a democracy.  Of course it was whites who 
then decided when their pupils passed their civics courses.  Political education was the 
justification for many of Wilson’s interventions in Latin America. 
                                                 
11 Paul Gorden Lauren, “The Denial of Racial Equality,” in William R. Keylor, The Legacy of theGreat 
War: Peacemaking 1919 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998). 
12 Zieger, 55. 
13 Knock, 3.   
14 Kennedy, 241. 
15 PWW, The Modern Democratic State, 5, 61-92. 
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     America’s interventions in Korea and later Vietnam along with fear of the spread of 
Communism prompted scholars to study Wilson’s policies in Latin America.  Many of 
Wilson’s early experiences with foreign policy were with Latin America.  Arthur Link, 
preeminent Wilson scholar and editor of his papers, argues that Wilson formulated a 
“Missionary Diplomacy” towards Latin America and the rest of the world.  This was a 
belief that he knew better than other leaders what was best for their nations.  The years 
between 1912 and 1914 were marked by failures because of his administrations’ lack of 
experience in foreign affairs.  Wilson also held a misguided belief that morality and 
reason would bring stability to a volatile region.16
     Link wrote that Wilson was the best informed and wisest of the Big Four at the Paris 
Peace Conference, a group that included Britain’s David Lloyd George, Italy’s Vittorio 
Orlando, and France’s Georges Clemenceau.  For all of Wilson’s wisdom, he had to 
contend with a hostile Republican Congress and other negotiators who never fully agreed 
with his positions. 17   
     Writing at a time when Ronald Reagan was combating the Soviet Empire, Michael 
Hunt argues that three ideologies have influenced policy makers since the nation’s 
founding.  He describes a racist hierarchy, with whites at the top, an aversion to social 
revolutions, particularly those on the Left, and a belief that for future national greatness, 
the spread of liberty is essential.  These three ideas have influenced all policy decisions in 
concert with the specific circumstances of each situation. 18
                                                 
16 Arthur S. Link The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956) and Woodrow Wilson 
and the Progressive Era  (New York: Harper and Row, 1954). 
17 Arthur S. Link,  Wilson: The Diplomatist  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
18 Michael Hunt, Ideology and United States Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 
14. 
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     Howard Hill and Lester Langley view race as a major factor motivating the formation 
of foreign policy.  Hill describes a paternalistic tendency in dealing with other people.  
Langley articulates an attitude held by American leaders that blacks were unable to 
govern themselves.  It was the duty of the United States to lead where and when people 
were thought incapable of performing the job themselves. 19   
     Wilson seized the opportunity to transform world politics at the peace conference after 
the First World War.  He imagined the war as one to “make the world safe for 
democracy” and the League of Nations as a Monroe Doctrine for the world, guaranteeing 
democratic governments across the globe.20  His Pan American Treaty plans resembled a 
congress of nations envisioned by Secretary of State James G. Blaine in 1881.  Wilson 
intervened and sent United States troops to stamp out rebellions and bolster sympathetic 
regimes in Central and South America in the tradition of William McKinley and 
Theodore Roosevelt.  He believed the United States would assume the preeminent 
leadership role in the League of Nations, and the rest of the globe would follow its 
peaceful and democratic lead, yet Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination and equality 
among nations often failed to materialize in his foreign and domestic actions. 
    John Dobson contends that spreading freedom and democracy were cornerstones of 
American foreign policy.  This combined with economic and political expansion to make 
America one of the Great Powers.  For America to become a Great Power it needed 
                                                 
19 Howard Hill,  Roosevelt and the Caribbean  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927) and Lester 
Langley, Struggle for the American Mediterranean: The United States-European Rivalry in the Gulf-
Caribbean, 1776-1904  (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1976)  See also Lester Langley, The Banana 
Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-19 30  (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983)  
Langley argues the United States intervened in Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Haiti to restore order for 
humanitarian reasons.  However, heavy-handed tactics and racist assumptions about the local population 
alienated the native peoples. 
20 Knock,. 113.   
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acceptance by the existing Great Powers of Europe.21  At the peace Conference American 
and British representatives worked together to ensure the maintenance of their dominance 
while declaring they were spreading democracy. 
     Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick reach similar conclusions 
about the importance of liberty.  They also argue for three main themes, but rather than 
race being a motivating factor in foreign policy, commercial markets were preeminent.  
America’s leaders created political and economic systems, which aided commercial 
expansion.  Policy makers believed that as commercial opportunities expanded, freedom 
and democracy rationally followed.  The damage caused by domestic problems such as 
increasing crime rates and poverty could be alleviated by the expansion of commercial 
markets providing new raw materials and consumers.  Expansion of markets meant more 
jobs and more opportunity, therefore less crime and poverty. 22  The social turmoil of the 
1960’s with the Vietnam War, racial tension, and the growth of a “counter-culture” 
sparked an interest in social issues.  
     This thesis examines United States hemispheric imperialism under the leadership of 
Woodrow Wilson.  The first chapter examines the historiography of Wilson’s foreign 
policy, his efforts at peace making, and the foreign policy of the United States from 1865 
to 1920.  It also describes the historiography of the patterns exhibited in America’s 
dealings with its Southern neighbors and the nature of empire and imperialism in general. 
                                                 
21 John Dobson,  America’s Ascent: The United States Becomes a Great Power, 1880-1914  (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1978). 
22 Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber, and Thomas McCormick, Creation of the American Empire: United 
States Diplomatic History (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1973), 126.   See also Whitney Perkins, The 
United States and Caribbean Intervention  (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981)  Frederick Merk argues that 
rather than an aggressive impetus for expansion, Americans have a sense of “mission”, which strives to 
deliver freedom and democracy to other peoples.  Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A 
Reinterpretation  (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). 
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     The second chapter begins with the original declaration of the Monroe Doctrine in 
1823.  The story quickly moves to the conclusion of the Civil War, which marked 
America’s expanding role in world affairs.  The doctrine evolved under President Ulysses 
Grant, who proclaimed the No Transfer Clause while advocating annexation of the 
Dominican Republic in 1870.23  Secretary of State James G. Blaine authored a proposal 
in 1881 for a congress of independent American nations for the prevention of war and 
civil unrest in the western hemisphere.24    
     The second chapter then focuses on the 1898 war against Spain and the 1904 
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that the United States had the 
right to intervene in Latin America to quell chronic domestic unrest.  It also briefly 
describes the rivalry with Britain, and to a lesser extent, Germany, over the spoils of 
empire.  The chapter concludes with an examination of the 1912 Lodge Corollary, named 
for its promoter, Massachusetts Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, which stated 
that the United States had the right to seize any harbor or naval station in the Americas if 
the nation’s interests were threatened.25
     The third and fourth chapters explore Wilson’s interests in Latin America, which 
began early in his first administration.  It examines the Pan-American Pact and his 
defense of the League of Nations as a Monroe Doctrine for the world.  Opponents of the 
League feared it would mean the end of the Doctrine, and that Great Britain would 
become the dominant nation in the new system because of the inclusion of the 
                                                 
23Senate Executive Journal.  Grant’s Message to the Senate.   41st Congress, May 31,1870.  461 
24 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1881.  Note of the Secretary of State of the United States inviting the republics of America to a Pan-
American Congress, 13.  Subsequently cited as FRUS.    
25 Congressional Record.  Henry Cabot Lodge speech on the Senate Floor.  62nd Congress, 2nd Session, 
10045.  Also Thomas Bailey, “The Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,”  Political Science Quarterly,  
48, no. 2  (Jun. 1933), 220-239. 
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Dominions, such as Canada and Australia.  Wilson argued that the United States would 
have as much influence in Latin America as Britain had throughout its far-flung Empire.  
Latin American nations were ignored at the Peace Conference.  Throughout this time 
period United States leaders of all political stripes claimed they were defending and 
spreading freedom by their actions and that the Monroe Doctrine served as the bedrock of 
their hemispheric policies.            
          This thesis argues that Wilson’s belief in the mission to spread democracy, 
informed by his racist beliefs of the inferiority of non-whites, was the primary motivation 
for his polices in Latin America.  Other concerns certainly factored into all of the policy-
making decisions of the Wilson administration.  Political, economic, and strategic 
concerns all influenced Wilson’s policies. 
       Julius Pratt argues that the United States expanded for primarily political and 
strategic reasons, with economics subordinate to the other concerns.  Americans were 
primarily well intentioned and were accepted by the colonized peoples.  Policy makers 
asserted that the American model of government could be duplicated.  The establishment 
of liberal democracies was beneficial to peace and security, which were necessary 
ingredients for economic expansion. 26   
     William Appleman Williams agrees with Pratt’s contention that Americans were well 
intentioned in their dealings with others.  His disagreement with Pratt is on the 
importance of economic concerns.  The need to expand markets and gain new 
commercial opportunities for American business, he argues, was the primary motivation 
in United States foreign policy.  American leaders stated that native peoples would share 
                                                 
26 Julius Pratt,  America’s Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and In Part 
Gave Away A Colonial Empire  (New York: Prentice Hall, 1950),  3. 
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in the economic benefits.  The tragedy for Williams is the absence of an equal sharing of 
the spoils, which were dominated by American interests. 27  
     Williams writes that Wilson adopted an “imperialism of the spirit.”  Wilson was an 
adherent of Frederick Jackson Turner’s “Frontier Thesis,” which stated that America was 
able to expand because the frontier would always absorb excess population and surplus 
goods.  Wilson viewed global markets as a substitute for the recently closed frontier.  
Three principles guided Wilson’s policies, humanitarian impulses, self-determination, 
and the belief that people must adopt American institutions to truly achieve self-
determination.  Wilson’s League was an attempt to stamp out revolutions and establish 
American ideals worldwide.  Williams argues that Wilson was not a liberal idealist, but a 
defender of traditional liberal capitalism. 28
     Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman assert the preeminence of economic concerns in 
American expansion.  Unlike Williams, they contend there was no humanitarian impulse 
in the expansionists’ strategy.  Economic power cleared the way for America’s rise.  
They argue the Monroe Doctrine was a method of controlling the Western hemisphere 
and gaining commercial advantage, not an altruistic mechanism of protecting weaker 
Latin American governments from the rapacious Europeans. 29  
     Milton Plesur also views economics as the prime motivation for expansion. 
Isolationism was not the accepted ideal of America’s role in world affairs, but a tentative 
                                                 
27 William Appleman Williams,  The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, New Edition  (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1972). 
28 Williams.  “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.”   
29 Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman,  Dollar Diplomacy  (London: George, Allen, and Unwin, 1926) 
 11
attempt at acquiring markets without political expansion.  Trade was the impetus for a 
more ambitious drive to a greater stature among nations. 30   
          Kristin Hoganson turns to gender politics to explain the imperialism of the United 
States.  Hoganson argues that policy makers make decisions based partly upon the culture 
in which they are immersed.  A male dominated culture emphasizing force and respect 
was very influential in pushing the United States to war with Spain and with Philippino 
insurgents in 1898. 31   
     Dana Munro argues that strategic interests are the most important factor in American 
foreign relations.  Caribbean island nations were weak and unstable; conditions which 
would allow European powers to gain influence.  Munro suggests that American motives 
were entirely self interested but based on political and security interests.  The extension 
of commercial markets was secondary to other concerns.  Writing during increasing 
American presence in Vietnam, Munro claimed that short interventions did not produce 
good will or lasting results. 32
     While no author claims that policies were formulated under the influence of only one 
source, Charles Campbell argues that a confluence of conditions and ideologies informed 
American leaders.  He writes that between 1865 and 1900 America abandoned 
isolationism and embraced expansion.  Manufacturers pushed for more trade to 
compensate for shrinking domestic markets.  Other influences were the work done by 
                                                 
30 Milton Plesur,  America’s Outward Thrust: Approaches to Foreign Affairs, 1865-1890   (Dekalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1971). 
31 Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish- 
American and Philippine-American Wars  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
32 Dana Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1964). 
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missionaries, the desire to acquire a European style empire, racism, and the works of 
naval advocate Alfred T. Mahan. 33  
     The first significant scholarly treatment of Wilson’s foreign policy appeared soon after 
Wilson left office.34  Charles Seymour assesses Wilson’s work toward the League of 
Nations and concludes that he was motivated by a desire to ensure a lasting peace for the 
world.  Seymour describes the war as a transition from chaos to order, and Wilson played 
a large role in the victory.  He asserts that Wilson failed in his bid for American 
acceptance of the League because he refused to compromise, but notes that Wilson 
should be judged as a prophet, not by his lack of success. 
     In the 1930’s the fate of liberal democracies looked grim.  Fascism and Communism 
reigned in Europe and the United States was foundering in the Great Depression.  In 1937 
Harley Notter studied the beginnings of Wilson’s foreign policy.  He identifies three 
overarching elements of Wilson’s policies, which were present before he entered office.  
These elements were his beliefs in morality, in self-determination, and that the United 
States had a special mission to export liberty. 35
     Critics of Wilson’s policies have argued that he traveled to Paris with unrealistic 
expectations and no clear understanding of the workings of diplomacy or international 
power relations.  In 1948 Hans Morgenthau described Wilson as an “idealist” who did 
not understand power politics.  This idea was refined and developed by diplomat, 
historian, and chief architect of America’s Cold War policy George F. Kennan.  Kennan 
                                                 
33 Charles Campbell, The Transformation of American Foreign Rrelations, 1865-1900  (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1976)  See also David Healy, Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-
1917  (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988) and U.S. Expansionism: The ImperialisticUrge in 
the 1890’s  (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,  
34 Charles Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the World War  (Yale University Press, 1921). 
35 Harley Notter, The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1937). 
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argued in 1951 that the failure of the Treaty of Versailles was responsible for the bulk of 
the security risks faced by the United States.  Kennan also portrays Wilson as an idealist 
who based his foreign policy on “legalistic” and “moral” arguments that did not account 
for “realist” power relations and the importance of strong militaries rather than collective 
agreements for national security. A strong military was also vital to serve as enforcer of a 
nation’s policies.  Due to the growing influence of world governing organizations such as 
the United Nations and the World Bank, Kenan altered his view of Wilson and describes 
him as “ahead of any other statesman of his time.”   Nearly all subsequent historians 
studying Wilson have employed the “realist” versus “idealist” vocabulary. 36
     Lloyd Gardner offers a new interpretation of Wilson’s motivations for a League of 
Nations.  Examining British and American sources, Gardner argues that Wilson sought to 
end the Balance of Power diplomacy in Europe and spread democracy.  Gardner asserts it 
was the experiences of the Mexican Revolution and the Japanese takeover of the Chinese 
province of Shantung that persuaded Wilson of the need for a new world organization for 
security and diplomacy.  For Gardner, Wilson failed to bring about a lasting peace or 
initiate a new world order. 37
        Robert Quirk examines the Wilson’s intervention in Vera Cruz, Mexico. He mines 
American and Mexican archives in his account of the eight-month occupation.  Quirk is 
critical of Wilson’s “moral imperialism.”  The intervention was a complete failure 
                                                 
36 Hans Morgenthau introduced the “realist” vs. “idealist” debate into the historiography of Wilson.  This 
idea of Wilson as an “idealist” was refined by diplomat and historian George F. Kennan.  See: Hans 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace  (New York: Alfred A. Knopf)  
and George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951)  Kennan  
eventually softened his views of Wilson and described him as “ahead of any other statesman of his time.”  
See George F. Kennan “Comments on a Paper Entitled ‘Kennan versus Wilson’ by Professor Thomas J. 
Knock” in John Milton Cooper Jr. and Charles E. Neu eds. The Wilson Era: Essays in Honor of Arthur S. 
Link  (Arlington Heights, MI: Harlan Davidson, 1991), 330.   
37 Lloyd Gardner,  Safe For Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to revolution, 1913-1923  (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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because of the president’s ignorance of other cultures and his refusal to compromise with 
Mexican leaders. 38
     Kendrick Clements comes to a different conclusion about the intervention in 
Mexico.39  For Clements, the occupation of Vera Cruz was a success because it denied 
arms and munitions to the rebellious general, Victoriano Huerta, which led to his 
downfall.  Clements agrees with Quirk about Wilson’s lack of knowledge about Mexican 
culture.  Wilson’s commitment to the ideal of self-determination left him oblivious to the 
notion that Latin American leaders would see his interventions as imperialistic. 
     Other assessments of Wilson have used dependency theory to analyze Wilson’s 
foreign policies.  Dependency theory emerged in the 1950’s as an explanation for the 
inequality between nations.  A central argument of dependency theorists is that 
economics primarily directs the development of social, cultural, and political institutions.  
For them, the international economic system consists of dominant and dependent states.  
A nation becomes dependent when its economy functions in direct relation to the 
dominant state.  Interaction tends to perpetuate the system of dominant and dependent 
states.40
     Mark Gilderhus operates within the Dependency Theory framework in his study of 
Wilson’s attempts to establish the Pan-American Treaty.  Wilson envisioned the United 
States leading the Western Hemisphere in promoting stability and economic prosperity.  
Gilderhaus argues that Pan-Americanism was a vital part of Wilson’s foreign policy 
throughout both of his terms but assumed a secondary role during the war.  He also 
                                                 
38 Robert Quirk,  An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz  (Lexington: The 
University of Kentucky Press, 1962). 
39 Kendrick Clements, Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman. (Boston: Twayne Publishing, 1987) 
40 See Louis A. Pérez, Jr. in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson eds. Explaining the History of 
American Foreign Relations  Second Edition  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 164-170. 
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reinforces the argument that Wilson was largely unsuccessful in his dealings with Latin 
American leaders. 41
     David Healy argues that Wilson was the “most interventionist United States president 
to date.”  Healy asserts that the United States intervened in Haiti to install governments 
sympathetic to American commercial expansion.  Wilson spoke of delivering freedom 
but took control of domestic security forces and ordered United States military direct 
elections. 42
     The historiography of empire is voluminous and varied.  Some works that are 
important to this thesis are discussed below.  These works offer definitions of the terms 
empire and imperialism and explore the different types of empire.  Some of these works 
also address the distinctions between formal and informal empires. 
     David Landes defines empire simply as “the dominion of one country over another.”43  
For Landes, imperialism is the “system (principle or spirit) and pursuit of empire.”  He 
argues that empires have existed since the “dawn of history” in everywhere people have 
organized themselves into states.  What sets Landes apart from other scholars of empire 
is his argument that empire is not primarily concerned with material gain or a byproduct 
of capitalism. 
     Niall Ferguson, in his book Colossus, describes many types of empire.  The form 
empire assumes is related to the form of government of the imperial state (democracy, 
monarchy), the methods of rule (military, local elites), the objectives of the imperialists, 
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economic systems, and character.44  Ferguson wrote at a time when the United States was 
the world’s only super power.  He argues that the United States Empire has been 
beneficial for the world and should remain actively engaged in empire.   
     Geir Lundestad offers a similar appraisal of American Empire in the 1940’s and 
1950’s.45  Lundestad contends that European nations encouraged the United States to 
take a more active role in foreign affairs.  Americans were able to assume a leading role 
because they offered a peaceful and beneficial alternative to the force employed by the 
Soviet Union.  Other nations tolerated an increased American presence in return for 
greater security and economic benefits.  Lundestad wrote this article in 1986 during the 
Cold War when the Soviet Union was still a threatening force and the United States the 
only nation powerful enough to counter the danger. 
     Samuel Flagg Bemis argues the United States undertook the role of protector in Latin 
America.46  Latin American nations did not invite United States intervention.  Bemis 
contends that the American public never supported the notion of empire, even though the 
one that emerged “was not really bad.”  The goal of the American empire was protection, 
first of the home territory, and second of the western hemisphere from European 
interventions.  Bemis labels this policy “protective imperialism” or “imperialism against 
imperialism.”  Our southern neighbors do not accept this interpretation.47  Bemis wrote in 
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1943 during the Second World War when the United States was a powerful adversary of 
fascism. 
     William Appleman Williams, argues that a desire for economic growth was the 
motivation of American empire.48  American policy was aimed at gaining a sphere of 
influence in world markets.  Williams offers a definition of empire.  When a strong 
nation attempts to dominate and direct a weaker economy, this “can with accuracy and 
candor only be described as imperial.”  Williams argues that Wilson’s policies 
constituted an “Imperialism of the Spirit.”  This was a combination of altruistic motives 
(the spread of democracy) and practical economic considerations.49  Although the United 
States sought to dominate dealings with weaker nations, policy makers did not seek to 
annex territory.  Williams wrote that this constitutes “informal” empire.  
     John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson argue in their highly influential work on 
Victorian Era British Imperialism, “refusals to annex are no proof of reluctance to 
control.”50  For Gallagher and Robinson the distinction between formal and informal 
empire is one of methods of control.  “Formal and informal empire are essentially 
interconnected and to some extent interchangeable.”51  Force (formal) is utilized when 
treaties and favorable trade agreements (informal) fail.    
     Germany successfully utilized the tools of informal empire in South America.52  Ian 
Forbes studied Brazil and Argentina because they were home to the largest number of 
German expatriates but contends they serve as representative of the entire region.  
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Germany exploited this community to create a system of banks, customs services and 
trading houses.  Military cooperation was also an important link between Germany and 
Latin America.  In 1912 Germany provided 16.6 percent of Argentina’s imports and 17.2 
percent of Brazil’s.53  Surely the presence of the United States and Great Britain were 
barriers to the formal expansion of German influence in the region, however informal 
methods also yielded positive results. 
     This thesis relies on these and secondary works for information and direction.  
Primary sources serve as support for the argument that Wilson was a reformer imperialist 
in Latin America, who combined racist assumptions about non-whites with a mission to 
spread democracy in his attempt to create a Monroe Doctrine for the world.  Arthur Link 
and his staff edited a multi-volume set of Wilson’s papers.  These are comprehensive and 
an invaluable source for this paper.  In addition to Wilson’s papers, the papers of the 
presidents who served from 1865 to 1920 were consulted, the Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States and the Congressional Record contain a wealth of 
information about the official government positions on Latin America and the individual 
nations therein.  Memoirs and biographies written by policy makers such and James G. 
Blaine, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Robert Lansing provided additional insight.  Periodicals 
and newspaper articles and editorials also serve as important sources. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
      
     Woodrow Wilson made Latin America one of his foreign policy priorities and in so 
doing he followed a long tradition of American policy makers.  The lands and resources 
of Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea have long been seen as key 
elements of the prosperity and security of the United States.  United States leaders 
coveted these areas for their wealth of natural resources such as silver, oil, sugar, 
bananas, rice, and other agricultural products.  Leaders knew the narrow isthmus 
connecting North and South America was ideal for a canal that would increase America’s 
wealth by speeding the transfer of goods between the East and West coasts.  It was also 
important for the defense of the nation, conferring the same advantages of speed and 
efficiency to the Navy as to commercial interests.54         
     More important than leaders’ recognition of the value of these areas is the idea that 
they must remain stable and republican to ensure the continued security and prosperity of 
the United States.  That America could serve as an example of freedom to the rest of the 
world was not a new concept in 1823, what was new was the notion that the United States 
would serve as the guarantor of the freedom of the Western Hemisphere and that the 
fortunes of all American nations were intimately linked.   
     John Quincy Adams, expressed these sentiments while serving as Secretary of State to 
president James Monroe in 1823.  On April 28 he wrote to Hugh Nelson, the American 
Minister to Spain, about the possible transfer of Cuba from Spain to Great Britain or 
France as a result of the war between Spain and France.  Adams maintained that the 
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primary causes of European wars were the denial of “civil liberties” and “national 
independence,” and the United States could not ignore those struggling for such aims.  “A 
feeling of sympathy and of partiality for every nation struggling to secure or to defend 
these great interests has been and will be manifested by this Union; and it is among the 
most difficult and delicate duties of the general government, in all its branches, to indulge 
this feeling so far as it may be compatible with the duties of neutrality.”   The United 
States, John Quincy Adams believed, must work to promote not only independent 
nations, but also those that respect individual freedoms. 55   
     Adams worried that a French victory would mean the introduction of monarchy to 
Cuba where “the republican spirit of freedom prevails among its inhabitants.”56  He also 
claimed that the inhabitants of the island would be opposed to the transfer of control to 
any other power and that the United States would aid them in obtaining their 
independence.  Adams presented American actions as a defense of the interests of a 
weaker nation.  He admitted the strong commercial and strategic interests of the United 
States in Cuba, but also claimed the defense of liberty and the will of the Cuban people. 
     President James Monroe set forth the American policy that would become the 
cornerstone of future administrations in dealing with Latin America.  Monroe formulated 
his policy after an overture from British foreign minister Lord George Canning.  Canning 
wanted the United States and Britain to issue a joint policy on Spain’s colonies.57  He 
wrote a draft of the policy stating that Great Britain believed the Spanish colonies would 
eventually win independence. Canning did not believe that Spain would be able to 
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recover its colonies, but England and the United States would not inhibit reconciliation.  
The final point stated that the United States and Great Britain did not desire any territory, 
but could not allow the transfer of the former colonies to another power because of the 
strategic threat it would pose. 
     Monroe consulted his mentors Thomas Jefferson and James Madison about the course 
of action he should pursue.  He wrote Jefferson on October 17, 1823 that he was inclined 
to accept Canning’s proposal.  Britain, he wrote, “must take her stand either on the side 
of the monarchs of Europe or of the United States and, in consequence, either in favor of 
despotism or of liberty.”  Monroe felt the spread of democracy was vital to the interests 
of the United States and any nations he enlisted in that enterprise would be to the benefit 
of both. 58   
     Jefferson responded on October 24 by saying it was the most important question “ever 
offered to my contemplation” since the Revolution.59  He reaffirmed George 
Washington’s warning to avoid entangling alliances.  He also suggested the Americas 
develop a “system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe.  While the last is 
laboring to be the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our 
hemisphere that of freedom.”  Jefferson felt that an alliance with England on this point 
would ensure no other nation would interfere with the western hemisphere.  Jefferson saw 
the fortunes of the entire hemisphere connected, with liberty as the glue binding them 
together.   
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     Monroe delivered what would become known as his doctrine during the annual 
message on December 2, 1823. The speech contained two main points regarding Latin 
America.  “The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the 
rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the 
free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth 
not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”  
Monroe resisted a joint declaration with Britain disavowing the aim of acquiring more 
territory.  The United States was expanding, and many felt the entire hemisphere might 
one day be a part of the Union. 60
     Later in the message Monroe wrote of the importance of republican forms of 
government.  The forms of government were what linked the nations of the Western 
Hemisphere and what separated them from Europe.  “ We owe it, therefore, to candor and 
to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare 
that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of 
this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”  Monroe said the extension of any 
form of government that was not republican would undermine the security of the United 
States.  Monroe identified democracy and freedom as essential to prosperity and vowed 
the United States intended to defend that system against any others. 61   
     The Monroe Doctrine became a cornerstone of United States’ foreign policy but prior 
to the Civil War the United States lacked the power to enforce it.  The nation’s borders 
extended westward, and territorial expansion was confined to the continent’s mainland.  
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However, the issue of slavery in the Southern states conflicted with the expressed ideals 
of freedom and democracy, essential elements of the Monroe Doctrine.   
     The United States annexed Texas in 1845 and the acquired the territory that became 
the states of Nevada, California, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and part of Colorado from 
Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 following the Mexican American 
War.  The United States added territory in the Southwest with the Gadsden Purchase of 
1853.  The nation’s northwestern borders took shape in 1846 with a treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain setting the boundary at the 49th parallel.   
     The 1850’s were largely consumed with the administration of the newly acquired 
territories.  The question of slavery became the foremost problem for policy makers in 
this decade.  The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 left the issue to residents, and the Dred 
Scott Decision declared that slaves were not citizens and were not free because of their 
residence in free territory.  The nation lost over 600,000 dead in the Civil War. 
     At the close of the war newspaper editors, political, and military leaders put their faith 
in the Monroe Doctrine as an avenue for reconciliation between North and South.  In 
1863 the French landed a force of 35,000 men in Mexico and overthrew the government 
of Benito Juárez.62  French Emperor Louis Napoleon installed Austrian Ferdinand 
Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. Confederate leaders established ties with Maximilian 
in an effort to gain French recognition of the Southern States and to open trade routes 
across the Rio Grande in Texas.  That strategy failed to deliver a Confederate victory and 
soon a few leaders on both sides in the conflict, weary of war, formulated a new plan. 
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     Northern and Southern leaders saw an opportunity for reconciliation through 
enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine.  The citizens of both regions would unite in a 
common cause, liberty, which would spread to Mexico, and eliminate all European 
influence on the continent.  In January 1865 the New York Times reported that the Albany 
Argus and the Richmond Enquirer advocated the union of Northern and Southern armies 
in order to capture Canada and drive the French from Mexico.63      
     French and British leaders both feared this plan would come to fruition.  Reports from 
London said the general feeling was that “the employment of the united armies of the 
north and south to carry out the Monroe Doctrine at once, and to its fullest extent, is 
considered the most probable event that can happen.”64  Three days later the Paris 
correspondent sent a dispatch to New York.  “The Monde, the leading Catholic paper, 
which has always been against the Union because it is a republic and Protestant, says; 
‘France and England will perhaps be obliged to defend themselves against the Monroe 
Doctrine- the latter its colonies, the former its expeditions.’”65
     General Ulysses Grant took an interest in the proposition and sent one of his generals 
to confer with Confederate leaders in Texas.  On January 14, 1865 he received a letter 
from Major General Lewis Wallace describing a meeting between Wallace and an old 
school friend.  “There was one point in his conversation to which he reverted several 
times, and which was suggestive of a new idea; it was that, if overtures were now made 
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to them, he believed the rebel soldiery in Western Texas, would gladly unite with us, and 
cross the river under the Juárez flag.”  Wallace felt such a union of the armies would 
“stagger the rebellion.” 66  Wallace saw foreign policy as a cure for domestic problems.    
          Grant authorized Wallace to travel to Texas to confer with Confederate General 
J.E. Slaughter, commander of West Texas, and Colonel J.S. Ford.67  Wallace met the men 
and wrote to Grant on March 14, 1865 that the Southern leaders were “not only willing 
but anxious” to conclude an agreement.  They “entered heartily into the Mexican 
project.”  The plan was never set in motion after the surrender of Robert E. Lee and 
Joseph Johnston in the East.68   
     This proposition of joint action against the French demonstrates the evolution of the 
Monroe Doctrine.  The Doctrine’s original intent, to exclude European powers from the 
Western Hemisphere, was subsumed.  Northern and Southern leaders saw the value of 
using foreign policies as a cure for domestic strife.  They hoped to end the destruction of 
the Civil War and forge a swift reunion of the warring states by focusing on a foreign 
enemy.  Advocates of this plan also stressed the dangers of a monarchy on the nation’s 
doorstep could pose. 
     With the war over, President Andrew Johnson and his administration could spend 
more time on the Mexican question.  In December he declared his position on the 
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Mexican situation.  “We should regard it as a great calamity to ourselves, to the cause of 
good government, and to the peace of the world, should any European Power challenge 
the American people, as it were, to the defense of republicanism against foreign 
interference.”  Democracy, freedom, and peace were thus all linked to the security of the 
nation. 69
     France was growing weary of the expedition and Napoleon III needed a graceful way 
out.  In November 1865 he met with American diplomat James Watson Webb who 
introduced the idea of a phased French withdrawal.70  He announced to the French 
Legislature January 22, 1866 that all French troops would be out of Mexico by October 
1867.71  Although this left Maximilian in a tenuous spot, he refused to abdicate his 
position.  President Johnson faced mounting pressure at home to enforce the Monroe 
Doctrine and expel the foreign forces from the hemisphere.  On January 8, 1866 E. 
George Squier, a United States commissioner to Peru from 1863-1865, sent Johnson a 
letter and newspaper accounts of a meeting at New York’s Cooper Institute “in favor of 
the vindication of the Monroe Doctrine.”72
     Speakers at the meeting and those who wrote letters of support frequently cited the 
need to eliminate monarchical governments from the hemisphere.  Senator J.W. Nesmith 
of Oregon asserted that France tried to end republicanism in the Americas and he 
supported military action to end the threat.  “I have to state that I am earnestly in favor of 
our government reasserting the Monroe Doctrine, and if need be, vindicating it at the 
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mouth of the cannon.” 73  A European monarch’s proxy was not acceptable to the 
attendees of the meeting.   
     The meeting resolved that the United States must “vindicate the great principle 
enunciated by Monroe.” “We have assumed a responsibility toward our sister republics, 
and an obligation to defend and protect them,” and finally to state that the United States 
will not abide the establishment of monarchy in the Americas.  The speakers and those 
who sent letters of support asserted that the continued prosperity of the nation depended 
on the maintenance of republican forms of government in the western hemisphere.  
Democracy would bring stability and that in turn would lead to increased commercial 
opportunities for all American nations.   
     Juárez supporters captured Maximilian on May 15, 1867.  His capture followed 
increased United States pressure on his supporters.  America threatened an invasion of 
Egypt with black troops if the French sent military aid to Maximilian.74  Johnson 
threatened to terminate diplomatic relations with Austria if they continued to aid the 
Emperor.75  Maximilian was executed June 19, 1867.  The lenient policy the United 
States adopted toward European involvement in Mexico during the Civil War, came to an 
end after the surrender of Southern forces.   
     The acquisition of territory was not the primary interest of the United States.  The 
expulsion of rival powers from the neighborhood was the desired outcome with the 
defense of republican government the stated motive.  Although the belief in the benefits 
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of freedom were sincere, the language used by policy makers accentuated the positives 
for the recipients of United States actions and downplayed the profits enjoyed by 
America.  In June 1865 Charles Sumner, Republican senator from Massachusetts, wrote 
to a friend, “I have a letter from a member of the Cabinet, telling me of a strong pressure 
on the President to enforce the Monroe Doctrine as a safety-valve now, and to divert 
attention from domestic questions.”76  The most important domestic questions at the time 
were the citizenship and voting status of freed African Americans.  Johnson was urged to 
defend the republican form of government in Mexico and to deny it to millions in the 
United States. 
     Ulysses Grant won the presidential election in 1868.  He also spoke of the Monroe 
Doctrine as a means for spreading democracy.  He was a strong advocate for the 
annexation of the Dominican Republic.  The addition of the island would bring a number 
of advantages to the United States.  On May 31, 1870 he said, “I believe it will redound 
greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization, and to the extirpation 
of the institution of slavery.”  Grant stated the Dominican Republic was one of the richest 
lands on earth and capable of supporting many more inhabitants than currently resided 
there.  He asserted that the Monroe Doctrine was accepted by all political parties and 
deemed “it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on 
the continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power.” 77  This 
phrase was added because Grant claimed the inhabitants of Santo Domingo wished for 
annexation and did not want them to appeal to a European power if the United States 
                                                 
76 Edward L. Pierce ed., Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner  (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1893),  To R. 
Schleiden.  Vol. 4, 254. 
77 Congressional Record.  41st Congress, Senate Executive Journal: Tuesday May 31, 1870.  Message from 
Grant to the Senate. 461. 
 29
refused.  It was an adherence to the Monroe Doctrine because it would spread freedom, 
enhance the security of the nation and increase markets. 
     In his annual message on December 5, 1870 Grant stressed the importance of giving 
Santo Domingo a “stable government, under which her immense resources can be 
developed,” which would “give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of laborers, not 
now on the island.”  He argued “Porto Rico and Cuba will have to abolish slavery, as a 
means of self preservation, to retain their laborers.” 78  Grant expressed a common theme 
of American policy makers, the necessity of stability, which is only possible under 
republican forms of government, for economic growth.     
     Grant viewed this acquisition as a stepping-stone to other areas in the hemisphere.  In 
a message to Congress dated April 5, 1871 he declared, “I do not favor the acquisition of 
territory, no matter how desirable, at the cost of strict justice to all parties concerned.  But 
if acquisitions by honorable means, pave the way for other acquisitions let them come.”79  
He believed that the residents of Santo Domingo wanted to become a part of the United 
States and indicated this could lead to further expansion in the future.  As he stated 
before, Grant believed the acquisition of the island would end slavery, increase the 
security of the United States, and increase the commercial markets and opportunities for 
the nation. 
     Grant did not express the view held by most Americans.  The acquisition of Santo 
Domingo never received Congressional approval.  Republican Senator Carl Schurz of 
Missouri explained that if the United States acquired the island more territory would 
follow.  In a speech delivered to the Senate on January 11, 1871 he also claimed those 
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living in tropical climates were unsuited to democracy.  He encouraged his fellow 
Senators to examine the history of the island.  “Read that history, read that of all other 
tropical countries and then show me a single example of the successful establishment and 
peaceful maintenance, for a respectable period, of republican institutions, based upon 
popular self-government, under a tropical sun.” 80  The annexation of Santo Domingo 
would not, Schurz claimed, lead to the extension of republicanism, but of strife, which 
would then be the problem of the United States.  Schurz shared the racist assumptions of 
most Americans.  The majority of the Haitian population was non-white, therefore 
inferior intellectually and unsuited to democracy in the minds of many Americans. 
     Schurz also attacked the claim that the Monroe Doctrine justified annexing territory.  
He argued, “that the Monroe Doctrine refers to nothing else but to the establishment of 
new colonies by European Powers upon American soil.  The Monroe Doctrine is a veto 
against that and nothing else.”81  Schurz cautioned against the extension of the Monroe 
Doctrine.  He felt it would lead to more problems for the United States, rather than 
alleviate them.  Rather than increased prosperity due to larger markets, America would 
become bogged down in a region that was not suited to a republican form of government. 
     Thirty–two years before Wilson advanced his idea for a Pan-American Union, 
Secretary of State James G. Blaine introduced his own version in 1881.  Blaine was a 
believer in “cultural progress.”  His definition of progress meant a strong economy with 
technological advancement and the expansion of markets at home and abroad.82   
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Blaine’s blueprint was to use the Monroe Doctrine as a guiding light for Pan-
Americanism and the United States leadership of the hemisphere.83
     Blaine was a Republican Senator from Maine from 1876 through 1881.  While in the 
Senate he was a strong advocate of improved transportation between the American 
nations.  He argued for a merchant marine to help improve commerce with Latin 
America.  On June 5, 1878 he requested funds for a steamship line to Brazil and rail lines 
through Mexico.84  Blaine was especially concerned with the threat of British influence 
in Latin America.  “I am sure you could get a unanimous vote in the British House of 
Commons against the grant of this aid by the American Congress.”85  Blaine wanted 
American commerce to be the wedge that drove Europe out of the hemisphere.   
     Blaine served as Secretary of State in James Garfield’s administration but served only 
a few months because of Garfield’s assassination.  His main involvement in South 
America concerned border disputes.  The War of the Pacific was a boundary dispute over 
guano fields rich in nitrates, between Chile on one side and Peru and Bolivia on the other.   
Colombia and Costa Rica also contested the line of their borders and turned to European 
leaders for arbitration.  Blaine asserted that this violated the Monroe Doctrine.86   
     As a method for ending disputes that disrupted commerce and to keep European 
influence from growing in South America, Blaine invited the American republics to a 
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meeting in Washington D.C. on November 22, 1882.87  On November 29, 1881 Blaine 
sent his invitations through the minister in each country.  “The time is ripe for a proposal 
that shall enlist the good-will and active cooperation of all the states of the western 
hemisphere, both north and south, in the interest of humanity and the common weal of 
nations.”88  The Congress would study ways to avert wars or the “even worse calamity of 
internal strife”, and to improve commercial relations among nations.  Blaine assured the 
other leaders it was not meant as a means for American intervention in their affairs or that 
the United States was the “predestined and necessary arbiter of disputes.”  Wilson’s 
proposal was very similar in the intention of ending wars and internal conflict.  Blaine 
and Wilson shared the belief that the United States would be the leader of the hemisphere 
and reap large commercial rewards from these unions. Blaine was on his way out of the 
State Department and the proposed conference would never meet. 
     A disgruntled office seeker shot and killed Garfield July 2, 1881.  His successor, 
Chester Arthur, did not share Blaine’s enthusiasm for the proposed conference.  Although 
a number of states had already agreed to attend, the new Secretary of State Frederick 
Frelinghuysen rescinded the invitations, arguing all friendly nations would have to be 
invited since the Monroe Doctrine was a well-established fact.89   
     Arthur and Frelinghuysen thought Blaine was promoting a foreign policy that was too 
aggressive.  The New York Times echoed this sentiment.  The paper reported that Blaine’s 
retirement “will be received with a general sense of relief.”  The editors cautioned against 
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a vigorous foreign policy.  “With the world renowned traits of America among nations, 
the last thing she needs is a reputation in her foreign policy for bustle, stir, vigor, and 
‘go.’  But, on the other hand, there are many reasons for a policy of silence.” 90  The 
author of the article articulated that the United States should abstain from interfering in 
the affairs of Latin American nations.   
     In February the paper pointed out inconsistencies in Blaine’s proposals.  The author 
noted his good intentions.  The proposal was “so full of sweetness and brotherly love that 
to criticize its purpose or its sentiments puts one in the attitude of pointing out flaws in 
the Ten Commandments.”  They pointed out he had previously argued for an American 
“monopoly” over the right to arbitrate disputes but later claimed the “whole world” could 
assume that role.  The article concluded with a statement that geographical proximity did 
not necessarily equate to cultural and political affinity. 91     
     Blaine did not accept his criticism in silence.  In September 1882 he wrote a paper 
titled The South American Policy of the Garfield Administration in which he described 
two aims of his foreign policy:  “to bring about peace and prevent future wars” and “to 
cultivate such friendly commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to 
a large increase in the export trade of the United States.”  The increased prosperity that 
peace would bring also kept European powers from assuming too large a role in the 
affairs of the Americas. 92
     In his annual message to Congress, President Chester Arthur provided an explanation 
for his South American policies.  Forcing nations to give up territory “would almost 
inevitably lead to the establishment of a protectorate, a result utterly at odds with our past 
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policy, injurious to our present interests, and full of embarrassment for the future.”93  He 
also rescinded the invitations to the Pan-American Congress on the advice of Congress.  
Arthur thought the United States showed too much interest in weaker nations which 
could be easily controlled and ignored the stronger ones.  “This is a very one sided way to 
go about the business of encouraging universal peace.”  Blaine would get a second 
chance however, as the Secretary of State for Benjamin Harrison in 1889. 
     Harrison was more amenable to the prospect of an international conference of 
American nations, with the aim of expanded American economic influence in Latin 
America.94  On May 19, 1890, Harrison proposed that Congress provide funds to survey 
rail lines between the United States and South America and on the 27th suggested an 
international bank headquartered in New York City with branches in other commercial 
centers.95  Latin American nations were once again invited to the United States in the 
hopes of formalizing a union of the nations.   
     Representatives from thirteen Latin American nations assembled in Washington in 
October 1889.  They embarked on a six-week tour of the nation and elected Blaine as 
president of the meeting.96  Joseph Sheldon, writing in the New England and Yale 
Review, made several suggestions for the delegates to consider.  Among them were an 
endorsement by all nations of the Monroe Doctrine, the promotion of international 
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arbitration, and the establishment of regular communication between ports in both 
hemispheres.97
     Blaine’s resolutions for reciprocity treaties, arbitration, and a common currency failed 
to pass.  The visiting delegates believed the United States would hold too much power 
and influence in the dealings between the nations.  Mexican delegate M. Romero, key 
powerbroker, and soon to be father in law to president Díaz explained, “It was thought by 
some that the purpose of the United States was to establish a permanent court of 
arbitration at Washington, and that was looked upon as a way of giving the United States 
a decided preponderance in all questions affecting the continent.”98  Delegates argued 
they would abandon too much power to the United States by entering into the treaties 
envisioned by Blaine.   
     Blaine continued to advocate increased involvement with Latin America and 
eventually reciprocity treaties were signed with fifteen nations between April 1, 1891 and 
July 1892.  They would all be abrogated by 1894.99  One lasting effect of the initial 
meeting was the establishment of the International Bureau of the American Republics.  
There would be regular meetings and the organization became known as the Pan-
American Union in 1910.   
     The vision Blaine had for closer relations with Latin America was reflected in 
Woodrow Wilson’s plan two decades later.  Greater commercial ties would ensure the 
prosperity of all the nations and tend to strengthen the United States as it weakened ties 
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between Europe and the Americas.  The increase in commercial activity would help 
guarantee peace and national security for the United States. 
     The security and prosperity of the United States and humanitarian protection of 
Cubans were the ostensible reasons for the war with Spain in 1898.  Cubans revolted 
against Spanish rule in 1895 and provoked a harsh Spanish response.  Cubans were 
herded into garrisons and concentration camps.100  Newspaper accounts, many of dubious 
credibility, appeared portraying the Spanish and brutal and uncivilized.101    In his war 
message of April 11, 1898 William McKinley made no mention of the Monroe 
Doctrine.102  He foreshadowed the policies of Roosevelt and Wilson by expressing the 
need of other American nations to maintain order within their own borders.  Some aims 
of the war were to “secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable 
of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, ensuring peace and 
tranquility, and the security of its citizens.”103  The goals set forth by McKinley were not 
simply the cessation of hostilities and the end of the suffering of the Cuban people, but 
the establishment of a stable and secure nation open to American goods.  This was a 
precursor of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and very similar to Wilson’s 
belief that stability was a prerequisite for the spread of prosperity.   
     The conclusion of the war brought new territories to the United States.  Cuba became 
a protectorate and Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines also fell under United States 
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control.  Despite the disavowal of territorial expansion in the Congressional authorization 
for McKinley to use force in Cuba104, the United States was there to stay.   
     Theodore Roosevelt, one of Wilson’s arch rivals laid the next stone on the path 
Wilson took toward his notion of a Monroe Doctrine for the world.  In his annual 
message to Congress on December 3, 1901 Roosevelt declared,  “The Monroe Doctrine 
should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, 
as it is of the United States.”  He continued, “It is simply a step, and a long step, toward 
assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace 
on the hemisphere.”105 Roosevelt claimed the Monroe Doctrine was the tool for world 
peace.   
     In that spirit, Roosevelt introduced the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 
1904.  He expanded the scope of the doctrine beyond the interference of European 
powers to policing the Western Hemisphere.  “Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence 
which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as 
elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation” and “the adherence 
of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, to the exercise 
of an international police power.”106  The United States now claimed the right to 
intervene in the internal affairs of other nations for the stated goal of preserving peace 
and prosperity.  
     Roosevelt expanded on this theme in a 1906 message.  He envisioned “an all-
American public opinion” which would “prevent international wrong, and narrow the 
causes of war, and forever preserve our free lands from the burden of such armaments as 
                                                 
104 Richardson, Vol. XIII, 6297. 
105 FRUS, 1901.  Message to the Congress of the United States.  December 3, 1901.  XXXVI. 
106 Congressional Record.  39th Congress, 1st Session. 19. 
 38
are massed behind the frontiers of Europe.”107  These ideas closely resembled Wilson’s 
drafts of a Pan-American Pact drawn up in 1914.  His two points called for the mutual 
guarantee of “republican forms of government” and complete state control of 
armaments.108  Roosevelt and Wilson believed that the United States could best guarantee 
republican government in the Americas and that this would ensure peace and prosperity 
for the world, not simply the Western Hemisphere.   
     United States policy towards Latin America underwent several changes from the end 
of the Civil War to 1913 when Wilson entered office.  Union and Confederate leaders 
advocated an alliance to oust the French from Mexico.  This would achieve several goals 
including the elimination of a rival power on the southern border. In Wilsonian language, 
proponents of the plan invoked the defense and dissemination of liberty. The easing of 
domestic strife was a beneficial side effect of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine.   
      President Grant championed expansion into Latin America.  Like Wilson would some 
forty years later, he stressed the benefit to American business and spoke in lofty terms 
about exporting freedom.  He claimed slavery would not be viable and the new territory 
would create jobs for millions of Americans.  Congress did not approve of Grant’s plans 
and President Arthur continued the non-expansionist philosophy.    
     The policies of President Roosevelt and James G. Blaine foreshadowed the Pan-
American Pact Wilson attempted to establish.  All three sought increased commercial 
cooperation between the United States and Latin America.  Blaine claimed the right for 
American mediation in the disputes of Latin America and Roosevelt expanded on that 
theme to claim the right to intervene to ensure stability in foreign nations.  Wilson added 
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his touch to the policy of intervention to bring not only security and peace to other 
nations but also democracy, a combination of idealist rhetoric and realist action.  A belief 
that democracy was the only legitimate form of government guided all of Wilson’s 
foreign policies, in Latin America and with Europe at the conclusion of the First World 
War.   Forging closer ties with Latin America became Wilson’s first major foreign policy 
endeavor.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
       By the time Woodrow Wilson took office in 1913, previous generations of American 
leaders had expanded the Monroe Doctrine beyond the original intention of keeping 
Europe out of the hemisphere to Roosevelt’s notion of the United States as a hemispheric 
police force.  Wilson, unsuccessful in his initial attempts to establish a Pan-American 
pact had an unprecedented opportunity to shape international policy at the end of the First 
World War. 
     This chapter analyzes Wilson’s empire and the uniqueness of America’s Empire.  It 
also examines the origins of Wilson’s foreign policies and how they diverged from his 
predecessors.  Wilson made Latin America one of his first foreign policy priorities.  His 
plans for a hemispheric community based on the cooperation of democratically elected 
governments became the basis for his League of Nations. 
     For the purpose of this thesis an “empire” is defined as a nation that controls a weaker 
state. This is achieved most often by military force, but also secured by political and 
economic means.109  The Spanish-American War and the acquisition of Guam, Puerto 
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Rico, and the Philippines are often described as America’s Imperial stage.110  Wilson 
became the leader of an American Empire.  The United States exerted influence over 
weaker nations’ politics and economics but did so with pliant domestic administrators 
propped up by American military and economic support.  Wilson defended this 
relationship in altruistic terms, arguing he was bringing security and prosperity to the 
weaker nations while downplaying the advantages gained by the United States.  
     Wilson and his predecessors utilized both formal (military force, annexation) and 
informal (treaties, trade agreements) tools to acquire an empire.  These tools were similar 
to the British tactics described by Gallagher and Robinson.111  The American Empire has 
been labeled Informal but the underlying basis for its maintenance was overwhelming 
economic and military force. 112  Wilson differed in his approach to empire by attempting 
to reform the internal structures of the nations in which he intervened.  He insisted on 
democratic government and believed this would result in economic and social uplift.  
Wilson required “good” government, which he defined as constitutional democracy, not 
simply compliant government.  This of course implies that Latin Americans were inferior 
and needed the tutelage of the United States to improve their lot. It is ironic considering 
the lack of democratic rights for African-Americans and women in the United States 
during Wilson’s time as president. 
     The United States emerged from the First World War as one of the world’s 
preeminent powers.  As president, Woodrow Wilson saw an opportunity to create a new 
diplomacy, one that would bring an end to nations resorting to warfare to settle disputes.  
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The League of Nations was based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, his plan for a postwar 
settlement, which called for open markets, freedom of the seas, general disarmament, and 
an end to secret treaties and secret diplomacy.  Wilson’s Fourteenth Point called for the 
establishment of a League of Nations.   
     One of the central tenets of Wilson’s Fourteen Points was the concept of “self -
determination.”  When settling colonial disputes, “the interest of the populations 
concerned must have an equal weight” with the colonial power.  Russia should have the 
opportunity for the “independent determination of her own political development and 
national policy.”  Self-determination was to be the rule for the people of Austria-
Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro.113
          The fulfillment of the ideal of self–determination took a back seat to the 
maintenance of the empires of the major victorious powers, including the American 
Empire in the Western Hemisphere.  A study of Wilson’s administration from his earliest 
addresses through the creation of the drafting committee of the League of Nations, the 
language of the document, and the arguments for and against the League, demonstrate 
that the United States sought more power and influence in Latin America and was the 
leader of an informal empire in the Western Hemisphere.  At Wilson’s insistence, the 
Covenant for the new League officially recognized the Monroe Doctrine as the principle 
instrument for the maintenance of that Hemispheric American Empire. 
     Wilson entered office with little experience in foreign affairs, but with a clear vision 
of America’s role in world affairs, which would guide him throughout his administration 
in Latin America and at the Peace Conference.  Wilson remarked to a friend before 
assuming office “It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly 
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with foreign affairs.”114  Although he lacked experience with diplomacy, he believed the 
spread of democracy was America’s mission and this would benefit every nation, not 
only the United States. 
     The primary source of Wilson’s vision about foreign policy came from his 
Presbyterian religion, racist assumptions about the inferiority of non-whites, and a belief 
in the power of democracy.115  Wilson received the endorsement of prominent African 
American leaders W.E.B. DuBois and Bishop Alexander Walters.  Dubois urged African 
Americans to support Wilson for president in his paper Crisis.  Wilson sent Walters a 
handwritten note promising “should I become President of the United States they 
(African Americans) may count on me for absolute fair dealing and for everything by 
which I could assist in advancing the interests of their race in the United States.”116  
Wilson promptly reneged on this promise of support when he entered the White House.  
Segregation was reintroduced in federal offices, many African Americans lost jobs or 
were demoted, and Wilson refused to meet with black leaders to address their 
concerns.117  Wilson argued that it would take many years of struggle for conditions to 
improve and legislation could not hasten the arrival of equality.118  Wilson’s actions 
actually worsened the condition of many African Americans.   
     Incorporated in this system was the notion that the United States had a special mission 
to spread democracy to the rest of the world.  Writing in 1902 as the president of 
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Princeton University, Wilson expressed the idea that a rising America would usher in a 
new world order.  “Let us lift our thoughts to the level of the great tasks that await us, and 
bring a great age in with the coming of our day of strength.”119  Wilson asserted that 
America was destined to join the ranks of the world’s great powers and by spreading 
democratic ideals, create a peaceful and prosperous world order, even as the United 
States disenfranchised African-Americans, restricted Asian immigration, and millions of 
women were denied the franchise.  
     Wilson believed that foreign policy was strictly the domain of the president.  As a 
historian Wilson wrote, “one of the greatest of the president’s powers…is his control, 
which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation.”120  This belief was evident 
in the formation of all his foreign policies from his earliest attempts at establishing a Pan-
American Treaty to his dealings with the Senate during the League of Nations fight and 
with any who would offer conflicting views from the State Department. 
     These views led Wilson to alter the policies of his predecessors in a significant way.  
Wilson added a moral element to his policy making.  Wilson and his first Secretary of 
State William Jennings Bryan offered a “New Freedom” in contrast to Presidents 
Roosevelt and Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy.” The “New Freedom” was based on economic 
gain accompanied by the export of democracy.121 Stability was no longer sufficient, 
constitutional government was required or Wilson would not recognize it as legitimate.    
     Wilson bypassed the State Department and ignored policy advice from experts who 
disagreed with him.   Spreading democracy to foreign nations was of secondary 
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importance to the maintenance of stable governments for the State Department.  In March 
1900, former Secretary of State Richard Olney warned against the policy of intervening 
in other nations to spread democracy.  “Were the United States to enter upon its new 
international role with the serious purpose of carrying out any such theory, it would not 
merely be laughed at but voted a nuisance by all other nations- and treated 
accordingly.”122  This notion was American policy until Wilson took office in 1913.  
State Department counselor John Bassett Moore warned Wilson of the dangers of his 
policies in May 1913.  “We cannot become the censors of the morals or conduct of other 
nations.  We regard governments as existing or not existing.  We do not require them to 
be chosen by popular vote.”123  Wilson believed stability was not possible without a 
popularly elected government.  Stable democracies were also necessary for Wilson’s 
second objective, economic growth.  Wilson was blind to the fact that the southern 
United States did not meet his requirements.  Blacks were disenfranchised and lived in 
constant fear of the lynch mob.  Wilson argued that legislation could not solve racial 
problems, that the federal government did not have the authority to intervene to prevent 
racial violence, and that over time, the condition of blacks would improve.124 Under 
white tutelage, everyone would prosper eventually.    
     Wilson’s foreign policies appeared altruistic but economic factors were a crucial if 
secondary objective.125  In a speech in 1912 Wilson stated the United States must enter 
foreign markets and “release our energies upon the great field which we are now ready to 
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enter, and enter by way of conquest.”126  Wilson spoke of conquering markets, not 
acquiring additional territory for the United States.  In Wilson’s view economic 
expansion followed and sustained democracy, but democracy came first. 
     Wilson did not believe in colonizing additional territory, but he was willing to use the 
military and put economic pressure on other nations to install governments that would 
legislate policies favorable to the United States.  Woodrow Wilson was not the architect 
of the American Empire, however he embraced his role as its custodian.  From the 
beginning of his administration he advocated intervention while speaking in altruistic 
terms.  He stated the United States would operate to insure the maintenance of 
constitutional, legitimate, representative governments, and would not recognize those that 
the United States did not feel lived up to those criteria.   
     Wilson viewed revolution and violence in Latin America as an anathema to stability 
and economic prosperity in the United States.   He stated that a major theme of his 
foreign policy would be the cultivation of cooperation between the United States and 
Central and South America.  Early in his first term in office he described his vision for 
stability in Latin America.  Wilson stated the United States would only work with legal, 
constitutional governments, which were not created for the benefit of an individual or 
minority.  On March 12, 1913 Wilson asserted the United States would “lend our 
influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and practice.”127   
     In an address to the Southern Commercial Congress in October 1913, Wilson spoke of 
liberating Latin American nations from the dominance of foreign capitalists in their 
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domestic affairs.128  He committed American assistance to the realization of their 
freedom to demonstrate the United States as a true champion of liberty and constitutional 
government.  Wilson wanted to “say that the United States will never again seek one 
additional foot of territory by conquest.”129  Wilson was not a colonialist in the traditional 
sense, but he acted imperially through the use of force and economic influence to bolster 
pliable governments and policies in Latin America. 
     Secretary of State Robert Lansing urged Wilson to expand the Monroe Doctrine to 
include the suppression of domestic revolution in addition to its primary function, the 
exclusion of European Powers from intervening in the Western Hemisphere.130  He 
argued that native populations should be the primary beneficiaries of this policy and 
Wilson should bear in mind “what has already been done in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, 
the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, and what may have to be done in the small 
neighboring republics.”131  Lansing argued it was vital for the national security of the 
United States, particularly in the Canal Zone, that stable and honest governments are in 
power.  This was a continuation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and 
another example of Wilson attempting to reform the governments to the south of the 
United States. 
     Wilson responded on November 29, saying Lansing’s argument was “unanswerable,” 
which meant that he agreed with Lansing’s plan. 132  Wilson indicated that he would not 
publicly declare Lansing’s recommendations official United States policy, but that he 
would use the memorandum when the time came to declare it official.  These memoranda 
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demonstrate Wilson’s desire to operate through formal diplomatic channels, in language 
colored with altruism, even as the United States reserved the right to use force when and 
where it deemed necessary. 
     To achieve closer cooperation with Latin American nations Wilson formulated a Pan-
American Treaty.  Wilson prepared the treaty in January 1915 and submitted it to the 
leaders of Latin American nations.  It contained four main articles: the mutual guarantee 
of territorial integrity and political independence, a provision for the arbitration of 
international disputes, governmental control of arms and armaments, and an agreement of 
a one-year investigation and arbitration period before the resort to war to settle 
disputes.133  Wilson envisioned this treaty as an expansion of the Monroe Doctrine.134  
He felt that all nations should guarantee constitutional and legal governance but that the 
United States should remain dominant. 
     This treaty was not well received by the larger Latin American republics, Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile.  Enunciating the same reservations they had to James G. Blaine’s 
proposals, they argued that the treaty opened the door to increased rather than decreased 
United States involvement in their domestic affairs.  Argentine Foreign Minister 
Estanislao S. Zeballos opposed the treaty on the grounds that the United States would 
intervene to end civil strife in violation of international laws and without the consent of 
the native government.135 The Chilean newspaper Mercurio articulated the official 
government view that the treaty would lead to foreign intervention in the domestic affairs 
of Latin American nations.  The editorial also stated that the preponderant power of one 
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nation in the hemisphere was counter to the notion of union and would further distance 
North and South America. 
     The Pan-American plan met resistance in Mexico as well.  On August 9, 1916, Henry 
Fletcher, United States Ambassador to Mexico, wrote to Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing that no progress had been made in receiving an acceptance from the Mexican 
government.136  General Pershing was pursuing Pancho Villa, and American troops were 
on Mexican territory.  The nations were on the brink of war, and the Mexican 
government was hostile to Wilson. 
     Fletcher warned that if the United States proceeded with the treaty without the support 
of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, these nations would turn to Europe for economic 
investments.  To counter United States influence, Mexico and Argentina attempted to 
formulate a Pan-Hispanic system, forcing the United States to concentrate their efforts on 
Brazil.137  This opposition to the Pan American Treaty demonstrates the opposition to, 
and fear of, American intervention in Latin America.   
     Europe, particularly Great Britain and Germany, offered the greatest competition to 
the American Empire in Latin America.  Trade and national security were major concerns 
of American policy makers.  In 1878 the British had £140,000,000 invested in Latin 
America.138  United States exports to Latin America remained relatively constant 
between 1865 and 1896 at just under $100,000,000 per year.  Imports doubled, mainly 
Cuban sugar and Brazilian coffee, during the same time period.139  Great Britain held the 
greatest influence in Latin America into the 1880’s.  Almost half of the trade in Latin 
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America was with the British, and less than 20 percent with the United States.  The 
British merchant fleet was four times larger than that of the United States.140
     The balance of power began to tip in favor of the United States in the 1890’s.  In 1895 
Venezuela appealed to the United States to arbitrate a boundary dispute with Great 
Britain under the pretext of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine.141  This marked the turning 
point whereby any use of force by a European power was regarded a strategic threat to 
the United States.142In January 1896 Britain agreed to arbitration, marking the first time a 
European power accepted enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine and signaling greater 
cooperation with the United States against Germany.143   
     By 1900 about 350,000 Germans lived in Brazil with significant population also in 
Argentina.144  Great Britain and Germany together had seventy bank branches in South 
America.145  Germany used its large expatriate population to gain political influence and 
create a network of commercial and military connections in Latin America.146  The 
United States main competition remained Great Britain, even as British influence waned 
in the area. 
     British leaders took steps to appease the United States in the first decade of the 
twentieth century.  The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty waived British objections to American 
control of a Panamanian canal.147  Great Britain welcomed a more forceful American 
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political and military presence in Latin America.148  The British were reluctant to 
challenge the United States military and in July 1903 the Committee of Imperial Defense 
(CID) approved the withdrawal of some forces from Halifax, Barbados, Trinidad, 
Bermuda, and Jamaica.  On March 31, 1905, George Clark, secretary of the CID wrote 
“we believe that the idea of opposing the navy of the United States…close to its bases 
must be abandoned.”149  American power was growing, but Britain was still an economic 
powerhouse and their military withdrawal displayed a clever strategy of allowing the 
United States to shoulder the burden of ensuring stability in Latin America.   
     Britain still threatened American economic opportunities during Wilson’s first term as 
president.  In 1913 Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy warned that the British 
government was fomenting insurrection in Mexico to benefit their petroleum 
companies.150  In 1908 there were sixteen coaling stations in Latin America, most of 
which were controlled by Britain and stocked with coal from Wales.151   
     The American empire was extensive before the outbreak of World War One and 
expanded significantly during the course of hostilities.  Working for a panel of American 
scholars and experts employed to advise Wilson and the United States panel at the Peace 
Conference, John Barrett, and W.C. Wells prepared a report about American involvement 
in Latin America.152  The report stated that the United States controlled 90 percent of the 
import trade to Latin America.  By 1918 the National Bank of New York City had 
branches in the capitals of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Peru, Venezuela, and Uruguay.  
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The Commercial Bank of Boston, American Foreign Banking Corporation of New York, 
and the Mercantile Bank of America also had branches in Central and South America.   
     In 1913, direct United States investment in Latin America was valued at 
$1,242,000,000.  With the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, European investment fell in 
Latin America and the United States filled the void.  By 1929 direct investment totaled 
$5,889,353,000.153  In the five Central American states United States investment more 
than doubled during Wilson’s term in office.  In 1912 total investments totaled $40 
million and reached $93 million by 1920.154 The United States under Wilson would use 
formal and informal measures to protect these investments and ensure stability.  Wilson 
preferred informal methods but often resorted to military intervention to ensure 
compliance with United States demands. 
          Cuba was an important piece of the American Empire from 1898 to 1934.  The 
1903 Cuban-American Treaty, which included the terms of the Platt Amendment of 1901, 
giving the United States the right to intervene in Cuba to preserve independence and quell 
domestic unrest, opened the door to American intervention.  The treaty gave the United 
States the right to intervene at any time to protect its interests.155  This treaty was forced 
upon the Cubans and was used by Wilson to intervene in 1916. 
          In 1916, there was a revolt to replace the U.S.- backed president, Mario Menocal.  
During the 1916 election, Cuban liberals felt they were being denied voting rights by 
force, and the results were so close that they were thrown out.  Wilson supported 
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Menocal and proclaimed that the leaders of the revolt would be held personally 
responsible for any damage to foreign investments.156
     The rebellion against Menocal continued, and in February of 1917 the U.S.S. Petrel 
entered Santiago Harbor to establish order.157  Several battalions of troops were stationed 
in Cuba and Menocal declared war on Germany the day after Wilson asked Congress for 
a declaration in the United States.158  United States troops were protecting United States 
investments and propping up an unpopular president.  Wilson acted against the principle 
of self-determination and worked to tie the Cuban and American economies more closely 
together.  Due to his racist views, Wilson believed the Cubans were not able to rule 
themselves without the guidance of the United States. A government based on the model 
provided by the United States was the only way to ensure security and prosperity.      
     The United States protected its citizen’s investments and tightly controlled the Cuban 
economy.  The United States worked with Britain to set price controls on Cuban sugar.  
These prices were fixed to protect American beet-sugar producers.159  The United States 
also controlled Cuban purchases of coal and flour.  When Cuban sugar producers 
protested price controls, the United States withheld flour and other foodstuff shipments, 
forcing the Cubans to capitulate to the price controls protecting American farmers.160  
The United States used the military and economic measures to coerce Cuba to formulate 
policies favorable to American interests. 
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     Wilson oversaw similar policies in Haiti.  In 1915 a rebel army took control of Cap-
Haitian.  The local government appealed for help to the foreign consuls who all 
petitioned the United States to send naval vessels.161  Rumors that Germany was bidding 
for coaling stations, to support military efforts in World War One, prompted Wilson to 
send warships to the area.  The sinking of the Lusitania by a German submarine in May 
1915 also strained relations with Germany.  Lansing supported Wilson’s decision, and 
argued that the Monroe Doctrine should be expanded to include “European acquisition of 
political control through the agency of financial supremacy of an American Republic.”162  
The United States would tolerate neither informal nor formal European control of any 
area of Latin America.  
     United States troops oversaw rigged elections, and pro-U.S. Philippe Dartiguenave 
won the election. Wilson said the United States must “take charge of elections and see 
that real government is erected which we can support.”163  The Haitian army and police 
force were replaced by an American-led gendarmerie. In addition to the gendarmerie, the 
United States exercised control over Haitian government finances. Secretary of State 
Lansing called American intervention “more or less an exercise of force and an invasion 
of Haitian independence.”164  Wilson justified his policies by arguing that the Haitians 
were unprepared to participate in a democracy.  This was the same racist rhetoric he 
utilized in all his dealings with people of color.  For Wilson, whites were superior and 
non-whites needed guidance and time to learn how to operate within democratic society.  
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      American troops remained and oversaw the 1917 Congressional elections, then 
dissolved the Congress on the eve of passage of a new constitution.  The State 
Department drafted a version of a Haitian Constitution, and in a rigged plebiscite where 
only five percent of the population participated, it passed by a vote of 98,225 to 768 in 
1918.165  Haiti became a protectorate of the United States and American troops remained 
there until 1934. 
     Wilson relied on the Navy to restore order in the Dominican Republic as well.  In 
1913, the United States sent observers to monitor elections.  Marines remained to oversee 
the 1916 elections in which pro-German factions were not allowed to participate.166  
Beyond the American policy of not allowing European influence in the western 
hemisphere, the First World War was in its second year and the United States was 
increasingly linked financially to Great Britain.167  On June 26, 1916, Rear Admiral W.B. 
Caperton, the Commander in Chief of United States forces in the Dominican Republic 
issued a proclamation stating that the occupation forces were there to suppress any 
revolutionary movements and would remain there until they were “stamped out and until 
such reforms as are deemed necessary for the future welfare of the country” were 
adopted.168  
     Dominican officials protested these actions.  A. Perez Perdomo, the Dominican 
Ambassador to the United States, wrote to Lansing December 4, 1916.  Perdomo’s 
protest stated that the Dominican government viewed the American occupation as a 
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violation of Dominican sovereignty.169 Wilson ignored this protest and the American 
occupation continued until 1924.  He was the ultimate formulator of policy in Dominican 
affairs.   
     Wilson initiated an attack on the port of Veracruz in Mexico and attempted to oust 
General Victoriano Huerta. United States investments in Mexico totaled over $1 billion, 
more than domestic Mexican investment.170 Huerta came to power by murdering the 
popular Francisco Madero.  Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta administration, 
following his policy of non-recognition of governments that were not democratically 
elected in his view.  Venustiano Carranza formed a group opposed to the Huerta regime.  
Wilson offered to arbitrate their dispute and both parties refused him.  He used the arrest 
of the paymaster and whaleboat crew from the U.S.S. Dolphin as justification to invade 
Veracruz in April 1914.171  Carranza eventually took power and denounced Wilson for 
his intervention.  African American leaders justifiably asked Wilson why he would 
intervene in Mexico to protect the lives and property of American citizens, but would not 
order southern governors to do the same.172    
   Wilson intervened in Mexico again from March 1916 until February 1917.  Pancho 
Villa, one of Carranza’s rivals, initially enjoyed United States support.  Villa promised 
liberal reforms and did not harass United States business interests in Mexico.173  Wilson 
abandoned Villa and threw his support to Carranza.  Villa mistakenly thought that 
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Carranza signed a number of secret agreements with the Wilson administration, severely 
curtailing Mexican sovereignty.174
     Friedrich Katz argues that Villa’s belief of secret agreements between Wilson and 
Carranza led to the event that triggered the second American intervention.175  On March 
9, 1916 Villa and approximately 450 men attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico.  
The group killed seventeen Americans and wounded eight.176  Wilson promised the 
public Villa would be captured and his group dispersed.  Without seeking permission 
from Carranza, Wilson ordered General John J. Pershing into Mexico and the so-called 
Punitive Expedition began on March 15, 1916.177   
     Pershing entered Mexico with a force of 10,000 men.178  American troops engaged 
Villa’s forces several times and by June 9, 1916 had killed 125 and wounded 85 of his 
supporters.  The army failed to capture Villa but did succeed in angering the local 
population.  United States soldiers entered Mexican towns despite orders to avoid 
populated areas.  On April 12, 1916 the army clashed with civilians in the town of  
Parral.  179
     Carranza asked Pershing and his men to leave, but to no avail.  After several more 
forays by American troops into Mexican towns, Carranza’s men confronted the 
expedition in the town of Carrizal on June 21, 1916.  Mexican forces captured twenty-
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four Americans.180  Pershing finally withdrew back across the border on February 17, 
1917.181
     Pershing spent over a year in Mexico and failed to capture Villa.182  The expedition 
was a failure on a number of counts.  First, Villa remained free, so the stated purpose of 
the intervention went unfulfilled.  Second, it alienated the Mexican public and the 
Carranza government.  Finally, the expedition was a clear demonstration of Wilson’s 
willingness to disregard the sovereignty of other nations.  Pershing remained in Mexico 
for almost a year after Carranza requested he withdraw.   
     Wilson ordered these interventions without regard for, or in consultation with, native 
leaders.  He decided which governments measured up to his ideals and were worthy of 
recognition, he decided on the use of military force, and he ultimately appointed the men 
that governed areas deemed unfit to govern themselves.  Again, the United States was not 
fully democratic.  African American leaders rightly questioned Wilson why he would 
send troops to Mexico to protect American lives and property but would not order 
southern governors to do the same in the United States.  Wilson disingenuously claimed 
the federal government did not have the constitutional authority to intervene to protect 
blacks.183  
     Wilson often spoke of these interventions in altruistic terms.  In 1916 he wrote to 
Lansing “It shall not lie with the American people to dictate to another what their 
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government shall be.”  Lansing wrote sardonically in the margin, “Haiti, S. Domingo, 
Nicaragua, Panama.”184  Wilson’s ambassador to Great Britain, Samuel Hines Page, 
offered a different view.  Commenting on United States policy in Latin America, he said 
that if the outcome of elections was not to the liking of America “we’ll go in again and 
make em’ vote again.  The United States will be here for two hundred years and it can 
continue to shoot men for that little space till they learn to vote and rule themselves.”185  
It was Wilson’s policy to intervene in the political and economic affairs of Latin 
American nations in order to promote stability and governments friendly to American 
interests regardless of the wishes of the native populations. 
     Wilson did not always rely on military force to pressure Latin American nations.  In 
1913 he announced the “Wilson Doctrine.”  Wilson stated he would not recognize the 
legitimacy of any government that was not democratically elected.186   This strategy was 
employed against Costa Rica in 1917.  Despite the fact that Federico Tinoco declared war 
on Germany and offered the use of their ports and harbors, Wilson refused to recognize 
his government and discouraged American investment because Tinoco came to power in 
a coup.187
     Wilson’s actions in Latin America were a dress rehearsal for his trip to Paris.  Wilson 
entered office with little interest or experience in foreign affairs as was evident in his 
dealings with other nations.  He disregarded advice from more qualified advisers, 
particularly those in the State Department who could have offered the most assistance.  
He routinely bypassed the State Department and ignored precedents and policies that did 
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not fit into his rigid world-view, based on his idea, underpinned by racist beliefs, that 
democracy must be exported and taught to inferior non-white peoples.   
     Wilson’s policies often ended in failure.  This was mainly due to his belief that 
democracy was a cure-all for any problems a nation faced.  He believed the American 
model was transferable to any nation and if adopted peace, stability and prosperity would 
soon follow.  He oversimplified complex issues and took no interest in the cultures and 
practices of native populations.188
     Wilson’s consistent and numerous interventions in the domestic affairs of Latin 
American nations further complicated his efforts.  The more powerful nations, most 
notably Argentina, Brazil, and Chile saw in his Pan-American pact the legal and 
legitimizing document for American military intervention in the region.  Leaders of these 
nations also knew this would be a one-way street with American Marines traveling south 
while they were powerless to respond in the opposite direction.   
     Latin American nations saw United States intervention in Mexico and feared similar 
incursions on their territory.  These interventions impinged on the sovereignty of the 
nations being invaded.  The peace and stability, which were sometimes achieved, were 
often short lived and the presence of American troops only served to postpone more 
violence and a permanent solution.   
     The United States was the frequent beneficiary of the interventions, not the foreign 
governments.  While interventions more than doubled under Wilson’s administration, 
United States companies were selling three times the amount of goods to Latin America 
in 1919 than in 1914.189  Much of the increase was due to the loss of trade with Europe 
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because of World War One, but United States pressure gained many favorable trade 
conditions for American producers. 
     Wilson used his Pan-American Treaty as a template for the League of Nations.190  
Although his policies were largely failures in the western Hemisphere, he saw a new 
opportunity for world settlement.  Wilson headed to Paris with an unprecedented 
popularity and believed this was the perfect opportunity to achieve a lasting peace, 
guided by the morally and militarily superior United States. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
      
     When Wilson traveled to Paris for the 1919 Peace Conference his primary objective 
was the formation of a League of Nations. The American delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference, Wilson, adviser Edward House, General Tasker Bliss, Secretary of State 
Lansing and Republican diplomat Henry White, intended to safeguard American 
influence in Latin America.  Wilson had enormous political capital because of America’s 
role in the victory and was greeted by enthusiastic crowds in the cities he visited.  His 
counterparts at the Peace Conference were not so enamored of Wilson as were their 
constituencies.  David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Georges Clemenceau of France, 
and Vittorio Orlando of Italy, along with Wilson, would take charge of the Peace 
Conference and became known as the Big Four.      
     Wilson envisioned the League of Nations as a Monroe Doctrine for the world.  In his 
famous “Peace Without Victory” speech of January 22, 1917, he said, “I am proposing, 
as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe 
as the doctrine of the world.”191  He likened his vision of collective security to the terms 
of the Monroe Doctrine pledging the United States to defend the integrity of independent 
Latin American nations.   
     During his speaking tour in defense of the draft of the Peace Treaty, Wilson argued 
that the Monroe Doctrine was not weakened but strengthened because it was specifically 
protected in the covenant.  During a speech in Los Angeles on September 20, 1919, he 
argued that the Treaty’s Article X, which guaranteed the sovereignty of each nation, was 
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the “Monroe Doctrine applied to the world.”192  It is important to remember that Wilson 
envisioned the United States as the driving force behind the League of Nations with veto 
power in the League Council. 
     Wilson raised great hopes of openness in diplomacy and equality of nations with his 
Fourteen Points. Yet from the opening of the conference the Big Four acted imperially 
towards the smaller nations of the world.  The questions of which nations would be 
represented, the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and representation on 
the Permanent Council were all decided by the major powers.  Thirty-two countries were 
invited to send delegates to the conference.  The full conference met only eight times 
which was a source of tension between the Big Four and representatives of the smaller 
nations.  Evidence of the United States’ informal empire in Latin America is clear in the 
records of the Peace Conference.   
     The concerns of the Latin American states were not guaranteed a hearing at the Peace 
Conference.  On April 17,1918 Secretary of State Lansing wrote to Dr. S.E. Mezes, head 
of the Inquiry, a group of scholars and experts in various fields that advised the American 
delegation, instructing him to prepare a report on conditions in Central and South 
America in case they came up at the Peace Conference, even though “they may not be 
considered at all.”193  The agenda of the Peace Conference had not been set by the time 
Lansing wrote to Mezes, however.  Wilson prepared to attend the Conference with the 
goal of establishing a League of Nations and he and the secretary of State were deciding 
what issues would be discussed at Versailles. 
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     In planning the agenda and representation of the conference, the other major powers 
supported the imperialism of the United States.  On November 15, 1918 Edward House, 
one of the American delegates to the Conference and one of Wilson’s closest advisers, 
sent Lansing a memorandum outlining the French Foreign Office’s proposed Scheme of 
Procedure for the upcoming conference.194  The memorandum detailed the French plans, 
and House made notes questioning or objecting to certain proposals.  The memorandum 
suggested that the Congress of the Conference would be “composed of representatives of 
the belligerent powers which have taken actual part in the war…A place must be reserved 
to the theoretical belligerents…the South American States (Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras) which might be represented by the United States 
to avoid crowding.”  House did not question or challenge this portion of the memo.  The 
French Foreign Office and House appeared confident that the United States represented 
the interests of Latin American nations. 
     The leaders of the Big Four powers were concluding a peace treaty for a war in which 
they were the victors.  Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States were the most 
responsible for that victory.  It was understandable that they would be in charge of the 
peace process.  However, they were also forming a global institution to guarantee peace 
and prosperity for all nations.  The smaller nations rightly wanted a stronger voice in 
affairs that would affect their interests.  For Latin American nations, the Unites States 
acted as though it was speaking for the entire hemisphere, despite Latin American 
requests for representation at the conference. 
     American representatives recognized they were the dominant power in the hemisphere 
but did not want to acknowledge the fact publicly.  Legal adviser to the American 
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delegation David Hunter Miller stated, “It is, of course, true that Liberia, Cuba, Haiti, and 
Panama are practically under the direction of the United States, and this might also be 
said of Nicaragua, but this fact is hardly one which can by us be emphasized.”195  A 
similar admission of United States hegemony came from Wilson to Lloyd George.  In 
notes relating a meeting of the Big Four the secretary present recorded Lloyd George 
arguing for Canadian representation on the Council of the League of Nations. He pointed 
out that nations such as “Nicaragua, Honduras, etc. could be represented and the United 
States influence in those countries was greater than the influence of the United Kingdom 
in Canada.”196  The account says Wilson “demurred to this” but did not want Lloyd 
George to use that fact to bolster his argument for Canadian representation.  Wilson and 
the American commission recognized the extent of the influence the United States 
wielded and sought to preserve it at the Peace Conference. 
     The United States decided which Latin American nations would attend the Peace 
Conference.  On November 19, 1918 Robert Lansing wrote to U. S Ambassador Edwin 
Morgan in Brazil asking him to inform the Brazilian government that its representation 
was not needed at the preliminary sessions of the conference.197  Morgan replied on 
November 25 informing Lansing that the Brazilian president wished his representatives 
present at the preliminary meetings of the council.198  Brazil was one of the few relatively 
powerful Latin nations.  They had objected to American interference and intervention in 
the past.  American delegates did not want any opposition to their hemispheric plans. 
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     Brazil had severed diplomatic ties with Berlin and declared war on Germany, and 
other Latin American nations had done the same, either directly influenced by the 
presence of United States troops on their soil, like Cuba, or in an attempt to win influence 
over the post war settlement. On November 29,1918, Lansing wrote to the United States 
Minister in Panama, William Price, that the State Department did not think that 
representatives of minor belligerent nations were needed at preliminary sessions of the 
conference.199  Price was instructed to forward the message to the United States ministers 
in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras.   
     Latin American nations that had severed diplomatic relations with Germany or 
declared war wanted greater representation at the preliminary sessions.  The agenda for 
the rest of the conference was being decided at the preliminary sessions and these nations 
wanted a voice in those sessions.  On December 24, 1918, Assistant Secretary of State 
Frank Polk forwarded a telegram from the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. 
Brum, to the American delegation, asking for such representation on issues concerning 
American affairs.200  Polk advised the American delegation that there was “very strong 
sentiment” in Latin American countries that if they were not represented they “will feel 
aggrieved and consider that their following lead of United States in the World War has 
not been appreciated.”  Again on December 30, Polk advised the American delegation to 
allow the participation of belligerent nations from Latin America or they may feel they 
“had gained nothing” for their cooperation.201
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     This advice from Polk was having some effect on the peace delegation.  On December 
27, 1918 Lansing sent him a telegram stating the United States was sympathetic to the 
desires for representation by the belligerents and those who had severed ties with 
Germany.  He informed Polk that the commission would “at the appropriate moment 
extend its good offices” on their behalf.202  Lansing also told Polk to inform the Latin 
American governments that although they could not promise to secure representation to 
send delegates to be on hand if they were needed.  The United States delegation was 
deciding when and if the Latin American delegations would be heard at the peace 
conference, in which one of the conference’s tasks was to construct a League of Nations 
for the stability and peace of the world. 
     Most Central and South American nations took some form of action against Germany 
during the war.  Their actual contribution to the Allied victory having been small, they 
were referred to as “theoretical belligerents.”  The nations that declared war on Germany 
were Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, and Panama, while Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru severed diplomatic ties with 
Germany.  Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela all remained neutral throughout 
the war.  All of these nations had to rely on the United States for representation at the 
Peace Conference.  America used its influence to decide which nations would be 
represented and what issues would come before the Commission.  When the war ended, 
“Wilson reigned dominant over the Western hemisphere, though, admittedly by less 
formal political means than the president had desired.”203  Wilson and other American 
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policy makers worked to ensure they remained in the dominant position and defended the 
Monroe Doctrine. 
     A potential threat to the Doctrine arose early in the conference.  On January 4, 1919, 
Frank Polk wrote to the American commission that the government of Peru was 
considering asking the Peace Congress to settle a border dispute with Chile.  Polk wrote, 
“it might be considered European intervention in an American question and therefore 
action contrary to what it has been our policy to permit in the past.”204  Polk wanted 
clarification on United States policy. David Hunter Miller replied that he agreed with 
Polk’s assessment and that he should do everything possible to prevent Peru from 
submitting this dispute.205  It was never submitted to the Peace Congress. 
     Wilson was able to persuade the rest of the Peace Congress that the Covenant for a 
League of Nations should be included in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.  American 
delegate Tasker Bliss articulated the prevailing sentiment of Wilson and the rest of the 
delegation when he wrote to Sidney Mezes, head of the Inquiry, that the basic idea of the 
League would be a world government “in which the ideas of the best class of men in the 
great civilized powers shall dominate.”  He also maintained that the Great Powers, 
including the United States, should always be involved in the League to insure its success 
because “the number of great, really civilized powers, will be pitifully small.” The United 
States would be able to maintain a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, and 
America would “dominate” affairs in Latin America.  He wished to “prevent the 
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government of the world from passing into the hands of the lesser advanced peoples, or, 
at least, being to some extent controlled by them.”206
     The American Council debated the merits of letting various nations sign the Peace 
Treaty, the first section of which was to be the Covenant of the League of Nations.  A 
memo from Miller to the American delegation advised that Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua as belligerents should be allowed to sign.207  Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Uruguay, and El Salvador should also be allowed to sign as neutrals.  Both groups 
participation in the League “would seem to be an interest of the United States.”  Santo 
Domingo was not allowed to sign because the United States completely controlled her 
foreign relations.  Miller also advised that Argentina and Chile be allowed to sign 
because they were necessary if the League of Nations were to “embrace Latin America.”  
He also felt it may be in the interest of the United States to include Mexico, though 
Mexico was never invited to sign the treaty.  The American delegation debated which 
nations it would allow to sign the Peace Treaty and join the League of Nations, and the 
debate always centered on the interests of the United States and not the interests of the 
Latin American nations.   
     Samuel Walker McCall, Governor of New Jersey, wrote to Wilson on February 26, 
1919 that incorporation of the Monroe Doctrine into the League Covenant would make it 
part of recognized international law.  McCall felt that the United States was beneficial to 
the rest of the hemisphere. “Every independent government upon this hemisphere is 
modeled upon our own.  Our republic is the mother of them all.”  McCall shared 
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Wilson’s vision of a connected hemisphere, with governments based upon the American 
model, and led by the United States. 208
     Wilson responded to McCall two days later and he assured the governor that he would 
work to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine and win its recognition by the other Great 
Powers.  Wilson believed if the other members of the Peace Congress felt the Doctrine 
were consistent with the League Covenant, they “would be quite willing to leave to us the 
single responsibility of safeguarding territorial integrity and political independence of 
American states.”  The Great Powers were willing to acquiesce to America’s request for 
continued hegemony without hearing the representatives from other American states. 209  
The Americans returned the favor, telling an Irish delegation their struggle for 
independence from Britain was a domestic affair, they lived in a democracy, and the 
problem could be solved by democratic means.210  The leaders of the Great Powers 
worked to ensure their continued hegemony.   
     Initial drafts of the Treaty also met with resistance in the Senate and from Wilson’s 
political rivals.  One of the reasons was the fear that the new League would invalidate the 
Monroe Doctrine.  Opponents to initial drafts, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican 
Senator from Massachusetts and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and 
former Republican President William Howard Taft felt that the League would allow 
European intervention in the Western Hemisphere.  Taft was also on the Executive 
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Council of The League to Enforce Peace, formed in 1915, which advocated a set of 
procedures for mediating international disputes.211  
     Opponents of the initial draft advised Wilson to add an amendment that recognized the 
validity of the Monroe Doctrine.  Lansing advised the president the American people 
would not accept a League that did not do this.212  Lansing himself was opposed to a 
treaty that allowed European powers to intervene in American republics.  “Such authority 
would be a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine.”213  These warnings of European 
involvement reflect Wilson’s own vision of continued hegemony in the Western 
hemisphere.   
     Wilson received advice from political rivals as well.  Taft sent him a telegram on 
March 18 that served as his model for the amendment recognizing the Monroe 
Doctrine.214  Taft requested several other amendments to the League Covenant but 
suggested the treaty would probably be ratified if the amendment guaranteeing the 
Monroe Doctrine were included.  Wilson set to work to get recognition of the Doctrine 
explicitly stated in the League Covenant. 
     Taft sent Wilson another letter signed by other members of the League to Enforce 
Peace, Henry Taft, the former president’s brother, A. Lawrence Lowell, president of 
Harvard, and George Wickersham.  They insisted that Wilson secure acceptance of the 
Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant, “rendering its continued existence unaffected by the 
Covenant.”215  Having the Doctrine declared valid would eliminate any challenge from 
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European powers and also from any Latin American powers.  If it was recognized in the 
Covenant, it could not be challenged at meetings of the League. 
     This amendment was not embraced by all of Wilson’s allies.  House worried that it 
would set a dangerous precedent.  In a diary entry on March 18,1919, he wrote that if 
concessions were made to America other nations would seek similar guarantees.  Japan 
could ask for a sphere in Asia.  There was “no telling where it would end.”  House felt 
the proposed amendment would jeopardize passage of the entire covenant. 216   
     Lloyd George was also opposed to a specific recognition.  He felt it would give the 
United States a “special prerogative” and “localize the League of Nations.”217  He aired 
this objection at a meeting of Peace delegates at which Lansing, White and Bliss were 
present.  One of the major concerns of the European powers was that the United States 
would not only use the provision of the Monroe Doctrine to keep Europe out of the 
Americas, but would also invoke its other provision, which stated the United States 
would not intervene in European affairs.  French representatives, especially, wanted 
assurance the United States would not shirk League responsibilities in Europe by citing 
the Monroe Doctrine.218
     Wilson repeatedly assured the French representative, Fernand Larnaude, that the 
United States had every intention of honoring its obligations under the League 
Covenant.219  Larnaude pressed Wilson to define the Monroe Doctrine in his proposed 
amendment.  Wilson always resisted this and asked Larnaude if he felt the United States 
was acting in bad faith.  Larnaude responded that he trusted Wilson but could not speak 
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for future American leaders.  Wilson eventually won this debate.  A diary entry from 
British delegate Sir Robert Cecil gives a picture of the American position.  On March 26, 
1919 Cecil wrote, “As the Conference goes on the dominating position of America 
becomes more and more evident.”220  He concluded by writing the greatest need for the 
future was money, and only the United States out of the Allied Powers had it.  This 
condition greatly strengthened Wilson’s hand at the Conference. 
     There is one recorded instance in which Wilson granted that the new Covenant took 
precedence over the Monroe Doctrine.221  In the transcript of an address delivered to 
delegates of the Peace Congress, Wilson is quoted as saying the Covenant took 
precedence over the Doctrine.  Arthur Link attributes this either to Wilson’s fatigue or 
poor stenography.  Wilson consistently defended the Monroe Doctrine and worked to 
have it recognized in the Covenant where it would become international law.  He 
consistently disavowed this interpretation in public speeches and in addresses to the 
Congress.   
     On July 11, 1919 the New York Times reported that Wilson had succeeded in getting 
the amendment added to the Covenant.222  He said it not only recognized the Monroe 
Doctrine but also strengthened it because the League would now enforce the Monroe 
Doctrine and keep European powers from intervening in the Americas.  Wilson had kept 
from defining the Monroe Doctrine and the United States was able to interpret it and 
apply it without fear of censure form European powers, strengthening America’s grip on 
Latin America. 
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     The wording of the amendment was not satisfactory to some still worried about the 
Monroe Doctrine being undermined by the League.  The amendment became Article 21 
in the final draft of the Covenant. It read: 
             Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of 
             international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional        
             understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of  
             peace.223
 
Elihu Root an influential Republican and former Secretary of War for Presidents 
McKinley and Roosevelt, felt the language was too vague.224  Root contended that the 
Monroe Doctrine was not properly protected.  The New York Times reported July 25,1919 
that the Senate wanted a reservation stating the Monroe Doctrine was “an essential 
national policy of the United States” and the United States alone would determine the 
extent and necessity of its use.225
     Having secured the tool of American empire, the Monroe Doctrine, in the League 
Covenant, American and British delegates set out to deny racial equality the same 
protections.  Japanese delegates approached Wilson with a proposal to end racial 
discrimination.  Wilson’s friend and advisor Colonel Edward House met with Baron 
Nobuaki Makino, a former premier, and Viscount Sutemi Chinda, Japan’s ambassador to 
Great Britain.226  Chinda and Makino delivered two drafts of their proposal for Wilson to 
study and amend.   
     The proposal Wilson returned was “practically meaningless.”227  The Japanese tried 
again but when Wilson read a printed draft of the Covenant, the racial equality proposal 
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was not included.  On April 11, 1919 at the final session of the League of Nations council 
the Japanese delegates requested a vote on their amendment.  Eleven of seventeen 
member nations voted in favor of the resolution.  Wilson promptly declared that it failed 
to pass because the decision was not unanimous.228  Wilson knew the ramifications for 
the United States if the League adopted the racial equality measure.  He again failed to 
match his idealistic rhetoric about freedom and equality in his actions.  
     With the final version of the Covenant completed, Wilson returned home to persuade 
the Senate to ratify the treaty.  Senators that supported Reservations to the League 
Covenant were concerned about the loss of Congressional power and the infringement on 
the sovereignty of the United States.  Reservation Number 5, which dealt with the 
Monroe Doctrine, stated “the United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by 
the Assembly or by the Council…any questions which in the judgment of the United 
States depend upon or relate to its long established policy, commonly known as the 
Monroe Doctrine.”229  The Senators did not feel that it was enough to simply gain 
recognition of the Monroe Doctrine but to prevent any further review of the policy. 
     Senator William Borah, Republican from Idaho, felt that even safeguarding the 
Monroe Doctrine in the League Covenant, would be disastrous for the United States.  He 
felt American membership in the League would lead to a repudiation of George 
Washington’s warning against “entangling alliances” and invite European intervention in 
the Americas.  “I think that insofar as language could protect the Monroe Doctrine, it has 
been protected.  But as a practical proposition, as a working proposition do you think that 
you can intermeddle in European affairs, and second, never to permit Europe to interfere 
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in our affairs.”230  Borah felt it would be impossible to keep Europe from infringing on 
American sovereignty.  Through the actions of the League Council, Europe “will control, 
whether it wills or no, the destinies of America.”231
     The United States Senate eventually passed fifteen “reservations” to the treaty that 
would apply to the United States alone.  The reservation concerning the Monroe Doctrine 
contained wording which placed the Monroe Doctrine “outside of the jurisdiction of the 
League of Nations.”232  Senators decided against requesting that they become 
amendments to the actual treaty, because this would require further negotiations and 
acceptance by all signatories.  Reservations were a way to safeguard America’s interests 
without rewriting the entire Covenant. 
       It has been noted that Wilson believed the president held the ultimate authority in 
formulating the foreign policy of the United States. He also had a particular disregard for 
the Senate.  When he first saw his newborn grandson he quipped, “With his mouth open 
and his eyes shut, I predict that he will make a senator when he grows up.”233  Wilson 
thought he crafted a groundbreaking instrument for ensuring world peace and American 
leadership.  The Senate, with the reservations, meddled in matters he felt were beyond 
their grasp and responsibility. 
     Wilson opposed all the reservations and embarked on a tour of the nation to garner 
support for the League.  He defended the Monroe Doctrine on a number of occasions, 
arguing that it was safeguarded in the Covenant and stating that he could not understand 
how the language of the Covenant could be misunderstood as not recognizing the Monroe 
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Doctrine. On September 8 during an address in Omaha, Nebraska he stated, “The Monroe 
Doctrine is adopted.  It has been swallowed hook, line and sinker.”  He declared that it is 
recognized for the first time ever “by all the great nations of the world.”234   
     The Monroe Doctrine was not, however, recognized by the Latin American nations. 
Policarpo Bonilla, a delegate from Honduras, asked for the inclusion of a definition of the 
Doctrine and a guarantee that the doctrine did not hinder Latin American states from 
forming their own confederation.  He also asked that Article 21 state that Latin American 
nations have the right to independence and freedom from intervention in their internal 
affairs.235  Uruguay and Panama expressed unreserved support for the League.236  The 
Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs challenged the Monroe Doctrine’s validity at the 
Peace Conference.  He argued that it was unilateral and “was never accepted either 
expressly nor implicitly by other nations of the continent.”237  Argentina and Mexico 
stated they did not recognize the Monroe Doctrine when they joined the League and El 
Salvador requested a definition and an appraisal of possible future applications from the 
State Department.238
     Latin American nations were reluctant to join the League of Nations because they 
feared the United States would dominate and gain more power.239  Lester Langley wrote 
that many Latin American leaders believed the League legitimized the Monroe Doctrine 
and this would further erode their power but later endorsed membership after the United 
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States refused to join.240  Lars Schoultz argued that Latin American leaders viewed the 
League as their means of countering more powerful nations.241  Wilson denied these 
nations a role in the formation of an organization supposedly based on the equality of all 
nations.   
     Wilson spoke in his most imperial tone in Spokane on September 12, 1919.  He stated 
the Monroe Doctrine was a principle regarding foreign interference in the Western 
Hemisphere “which the United States is at liberty to apply in any circumstances where it 
thought it pertinent.  That means the United States means to play big brother to the 
western hemisphere in any circumstances where it thinks it wise to play big brother.”  He 
also explained that he avoided including a definition of the Doctrine in the Covenant 
because the United States might wish to expand it. 242    
     On only two occasions during his tour did Wilson acknowledge the American Empire 
in Latin America.  Defending the League against accusations that the British Empire 
would control six votes to the one of the United States, Wilson pointed out that the 
United States greatly influenced Cuba and Panama.  On September 19 in San Diego he 
stated those countries were “under the direction and directorate of the United States.”243  
The next day at the Shrine Auditorium he reiterated that the two nations were “very much 
under the influence of the United States.”244  Wilson admitted these nations were under 
the control of the United States, but he still refused to acknowledge the extent of the 
American Empire in Latin America.  This slight of hand directly contradicted his 
statements of self-determination for all nations.   
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     The Senate debated the question of accepting the treaty that October.  The issue of 
United States control of Latin American nations emerged during debates about voting 
equality in the League.  Senator Thomas of Colorado argued that it might appear to 
outsiders that the United States controlled the foreign policy of “certain countries to the 
south of us.”245  Senator Fall of New Mexico asked if Thomas felt that was in fact the 
case, and he responded he did not know.  Thomas continued that Panama was “entirely 
under the influence of the United States.”  He stated that he did not believe America 
would use that position to influence Panama’s voting in the League of Nations.  
However, the United States used that influence to prop up compliant governments, and it 
would surely use its influence to sway the votes of those nations in the League of 
Nations.  The instrument of American intervention was the Monroe Doctrine and Wilson 
and the Senate fought to have it recognized at Paris. 
     Senator Thomas spoke altruistically of the American role in Nicaragua.  He said that 
government “stands, and has rested for years on the bayonets of the United States 
marines.”  He argued that the government of Haiti also survived because of the marines.  
“We have then, in a political sense, and probably in an economic sense, four 
dependencies in this hemisphere.”  Thomas again asserted his belief that the United 
States government would not use that position to influence any of the votes of those 
countries in the League.  This was political double speak however, Wilson admitted as 
much to Lloyd George in Paris and twice during his speaking tour. 246  With the Monroe 
Doctrine safeguarded in the League Covenant, and other powerful nations eager to 
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perpetuate their own empires, United States interventions would certainly continue and 
hegemony of the hemisphere was assured. 
     The United States Senate never ratified the Versailles Peace Treaty.  Wilson’s vision 
for an expanded Monroe Doctrine for the world was not recognized by the United States.  
Despites his assertions of the equality of large and small nations and the ideals of self 
determination, he continually intervened in Latin America to install governments that 
were sympathetic to or compliant with American interests.   
     Republicans and Democrats were eager to preserve the instrument of American 
intervention, the Monroe Doctrine.  Wilson fought for its inclusion and recognition in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, effectively removing Central and South America 
from the League’s protective mechanisms.  Wilson only grudgingly admitted to United 
States influence in Latin nations.  He always spoke in altruistic terms about American 
interventions even when confronted with foreign ministers asking for independence or a 
simple definition of United States policy.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
      Woodrow Wilson was a Reformer Imperialist.  His policies were shaped by the desire 
to spread democracy in order to foster peace and prosperity.  His racism informed his 
imperialist foreign policies.  Wilson made Latin America the object of his first foreign 
policy endeavors.  In his famous Mobile Address in 1913, he promised a new era in the 
relations between the nations of the Americas based on friendship and equality.  More 
important than material interests was “the development of constitutional liberty in the 
world.”  The United States was not interested in territorial acquisition he assured his 
audience, but “human liberty and national opportunity.”  The relationship of the United 
States to the rest of the hemisphere “is the relationship of a family of mankind devoted to 
the development of true constitutional liberty.”247  Wilson argued that without 
democracy, prosperity and security were not possible.  He enforced this belief through 
imperial methods of intervention, non-recognition, and economic dominance, justified by 
a racist view that no-whites needed training in the workings of democracy. 
     Wilson built upon the work of his predecessors but deviated in his insistence on 
democratic governments.  He disregarded state department experts who warned him 
against this new plan.  This is evident in his rhetoric about the relationship between the 
American states and his actions in Costa Rica, refusing to recognize the Tinoco regime 
even after being offered the use of harbors and ports and a Costa Rican declaration of war 
against Germany.  He intervened in Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua insisting on constitutional 
reform under American guidance before withdrawal.  
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     Wilson saw his actions as beneficial to both the United States and the nations in which 
he intervened.  This leads to the question, is empire ever a good thing? The Imperial 
nation surely benefits in its dominant role with other nations.  What about the dominated?  
Niall Ferguson argues that there are a number of benefits that may accompany imperial 
rule.  He lists greater security, improved government, and increases in health, education, 
and economic opportunity.248
     These benefits are not guaranteed to apply equally to all or even to many.  Security 
and peace are desirable but if the bayonets of a foreign army provide them, with no 
accountability, the local population may not feel so secure.  Education is a great benefit, 
however if native cultures, customs, and language are supplanted by the imperial powers, 
the cost is too great and the benefits flow away from the native population.  Education is 
often accompanied by religious instruction, another way weaker peoples feel their culture 
is robbed by imperialism.   
     The subjects of empire and imperialism offer many avenues for further research.  A 
comparative study of the British and American empires in South and Central America 
would be a major contribution.  This would provide an opportunity to examine how Latin 
Americans attempted to manipulate the two powers against one another for their own 
benefit and how oppressed people react to the supposed benefits of being linked to a 
strong economy.     
     Venezuela appealed to the United States to arbitrate a border dispute with England in 
1895 citing the Monroe Doctrine.249  The Latin American response to the Monroe 
Doctrine and the effort to obtain a definition would also make an important addition to 
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the literature of the subject.  The example of Venezuela demonstrates that some nations 
found the Monroe Doctrine beneficial.  Playing one side against the other could bring 
short-term gain, or the exchange of one imperial power for another closer to home.     
     Wilson was unique in his formation of foreign policy because his was based on a 
moral as well as practical foundation.  However, he exerted United States influence with 
little regard to the protests of other American nations or realizing the failure of the United 
States to deliver freedom and security to millions of its own citizens.  American and 
British leaders formulated the core of the Monroe Doctrine without consulting foreign 
governments.  The initial targets of the Doctrine were other European nations, not Latin 
American nations but it became a way of legitimizing interference in the affairs of other 
states.  This reflects Wilson’s notions of a racial hierarchy with whites in the dominant 
role, guiding the less civilized people of the world.   
     Every president from Monroe through Wilson reaffirmed or expanded the Monroe 
Doctrine.  The French intervention in Mexico and installation of Emperor Maximilian 
was a major test of the Doctrine.  With the United States enmeshed in the Civil War, 
American leaders were unable or unwilling to enforce the long-standing policy meant to 
prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere.    
     The threat of enforcement was still a concern to European leaders.  As the Civil War 
drew to a close Confederate and Union Generals, including Ulysses Grant entertained the 
idea of joining forces to oust the French from Mexico.  This strategy served to fulfill the 
original intent of the Monroe Doctrine, eliminating European powers from the Western 
Hemisphere, but also aid the spread of democracy and ease domestic tensions. 
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     The American colonies had expanded before they became a sovereign nation.  
Territorial and economic expansion often went hand in hand.  After 1898, American 
leaders including Wilson stated they did not wish to annex any additional territory.  As 
the nation became industrialized, economic expansion replaced territorial gain as vital to 
the nation’s security and prosperity.  Wilson sought to ensure greater economic 
prosperity for the United States through the exportation and defense of democracy.  He 
also believed the white leaders of the United States were obligated to guide non-whites 
on their march to democracy.  
     Wilson entered office with little experience in foreign affairs but a powerful 
ideological vision, which was the foundation of his dealings with all other nations and 
domestic leaders.  He believed democracy was the sole legitimate form of government 
and the United States had a duty to export freedom to the world.  His disregard for State 
Department policies and expertise led to many failures in Latin America and in the fight 
for the ratification of the Versailles treaty by the United States Congress.  His 
unwillingness to compromise led to the defeat of his peace plan in the United States 
Senate.  His racism and reliance on southern votes blinded him to the fact that true 
democracy did not exist in the United States.  Millions of African Americans and women 
were not able to determine their own leaders. 
     Wilson intervened in the neighboring countries when and where he chose, with little 
regard for the wishes of the local population.  He tried to create a Pan-American pact 
under United States leadership, but Latin American nations rebuffed the plan for fear of 
increased American involvement in their internal affairs.  Wilson chose which Latin 
American nations were allowed at the Paris Peace Conference, operated in private with 
 85
other major powers, and they decided what topics would be discussed at the table.  The 
destruction of the victorious powers’ empires was not high on the priority list. 
   This thesis argues that Wilson was a reformer imperialist and one of the most 
interventionist of all the presidents.  He understood that the United States would be the 
principle beneficiary of his policies, but he believed all people would be uplifted also.       
Wilson attempted to reform and improve the internal structures of the nations he dealt 
with. Wilson, however, was racist and believed in the superiority of whites.  He told 
degrading jokes and stories at cabinet meetings, refused to meet with black leaders, and 
did little to stop racial violence.  He was sincere in his beliefs that United States tutelage 
would benefit the entire hemisphere, but like many reformers, treated those he aimed to 
help as inferiors, incapable of formulating their own strategies for uplift.  He decided 
which governments were acceptable, when to use force, dictated peace terms, and 
reserved the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations.  Wilson 
also believed the native populations would benefit with improved communications and 
infrastructure, stable government, increased security, peace, and prosperity.  These can all 
be of great benefit, but when forced by outsiders who also bring degradation and 
humiliation, the cost is too great. 
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